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Abstract 
 
Does neglecting the possibility that fossil fuel reserves become “stranded” result in a “carbon 
bubble”, i.e., an overvaluation of fossil fuel firms? To address this question, we study whether 
banks price the climate policy risk. We hand collect global data on corporate fossil fuel reserves, 
match it with syndicated loans, and subsequently compare the loan rate charged to fossil fuel 
firms — along their climate policy exposure — to non-fossil fuel firms. We find that before 2015 
banks did not price climate policy risk. After 2015, however, the risk is priced, especially for 
firms holding more fossil fuel reserves. We also provide some evidence that “green banks” 
charge marginally higher loan rates to fossil fuel firms. 
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1. Introduction 
The carbon bubble is a hypothesized bubble in the valuation of firms that heavily depend on 
fossil fuels as factors of production. The term first appeared in a media article published by Le 
Page (2011) and in a report by the Carbon Tracker Initiative (2011). Subsequently, there has 
been an ongoing public discussion on the possibility that this hypothesized bubble affects 
financial stability (e.g., Bank of England 2015; ESRB 2016). Theoretically, higher than intrinsic 
values of fossil fuel firms might occur owing to ongoing policy initiatives to move to cleaner 
technology in the near future, so that fossil fuel reserves will lose their economic value and 
become unburnable or “stranded”. This would imply considerable losses for fossil fuel firms, 
especially vis-à-vis other firms. 
In this paper we examine the existence of a carbon bubble using the corporate loan 
market. We empirically study whether banks price in the risk that fossil fuel reserves will 
become stranded (i.e., banks price in the climate policy risk or exposure of fossil fuel firms). Our 
hypothesis is that a carbon bubble does not exist if banks place considerable weight on climate 
policy exposure when formulating the terms of lending to fossil fuel firms. Despite the potential 
importance for financial and economic stability of such loan pricing decisions of banks, there are 
no studies aiming at identifying a carbon bubble in the credit market. 
The syndicated loan market provides an ideal setting to test our hypothesis for at least 
two interrelated reasons. First, banks are well-informed economic agents and, in principle, 
should price in the possibility that fossil fuel reserves will be stranded and the involved firms 
will incur losses. If they do not, then they clearly disregard an important source of risk for the 
sake of offering more competitive loan rates. In addition, syndicated loans are large loan 
contracts, potentially implying large or even crippling losses for the involved lenders if they are 
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mispriced. This holds especially for the lead arrangers, who usually hold large shares of the loans 
and are the ones responsible for pricing decisions. 
Second, in the formation of the loan syndicate, lead banks are liable to participant banks 
for the pricing of all relevant risks, and the effective screening and monitoring of borrowing 
firms. Thus, despite any moral hazard issues in the formation of the syndicate (Sufi 2007; 
Ivashina 2009), lead arrangers have additional reputational incentives to price loans accurately 
and face associated reputational costs if they do not. 
To conduct our analysis, we match syndicated loans data from Dealscan with firm-year 
data from Compustat. We concentrate on the period from 2007 onward because the appropriate 
environmental policy initiatives are relatively recent and data on country-specific climate 
stringency indicators become readily available. Our main outcome variable is the all-in-spread-
drawn (AISD), defined as the loan spread plus any facility fee, but in sensitivity tests we also use 
information on commitment fees. Subsequently, we hand-collect firm-year data on fossil fuel 
reserves from firms’ annual reports. Some firms hold fossil fuel reserves in more than one 
country and thus we construct a relative measure of reserves for each firm, in each country, and 
in each year. Finally, we generate a firm-year measure of climate policy exposure (risk) from the 
product of relative reserves and either one of the Climate Change Cooperation Index (C3I) by 
Bernauer and Böhmelt (2013) or the Climate Change Policy Index (CCPI) by Germanwatch. 
These country-year indices, respectively available for the periods 1996-2014 and 2007-2017, 
reflect environmental policy stringency and thus risk. 
To ensure empirical identification, we mainly use a framework, whereby we compare (i) 
the loan pricing of fossil fuel firms (treatment group) to non-fossil fuel firms (control group), and 
(ii) fossil fuel firms according to their different country-specific climate policy exposure. This is 
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a robust empirical model, as long as our measure of climate policy exposure is independent from 
other idiosyncratic shocks that also affect loan spreads and fees. To this end, the validity of our 
identification method is significantly strengthened via the fielding of several loan and firm-year 
characteristics and fixed effects (e.g., loan type and purpose, country and year fixed effects, etc.). 
Important fixed effects are the bank*year ones, which saturate the model with time-varying 
supply-side characteristics that might affect loan spreads, and the firms’ country effects, which 
imply identification before and after changes in the country-specific climate policy exposure. 
These controls and fixed effects make it unlikely that our model suffers from a violation of its 
identifying assumptions. 
Our results, drawn from the full sample, show that the AISD of fossil fuel firms that are 
more exposed to climate policy risk are not significantly higher compared to non-fossil fuel firms 
and fossil fuel firms with relatively low risk. This result holds irrespective of the mix of firm 
controls and fixed effects, and the measure of environmental policy stringency used (C3I or 
CCPI). We posit that this finding either suggests the existence of a carbon bubble due to the non-
pricing of environmental policy exposure of fossil fuel firms or shows that banks specifically 
disregard the possibility that environmental policy will lead to considerable losses from stranded 
assets. 
As the notion of a carbon bubble is relatively recent, originating in 2011 and gaining in 
prominence only after the Paris Agreement in December 2015, we subsequently focus on the 
most recent years of our sample. Specifically, we examine a model, where we compare the AISD 
(i) of fossil fuel firms according to their environmental policy exposure, (ii) of fossil fuel to non-
fossil fuel firms, and (iii) before and after each year from 2011 onward. When using the CCPI-
based measure of climate policy exposure, which is available for the most recent years of our 
4 
 
sample, we find the first evidence for pricing of climate policy risk in the post-2015 period. 
However, the economic significance is rather small: a one standard deviation increase in our 
measure of climate policy exposure implies that risky fossil fuel firms from 2015 onward are on 
average given a 2-basis points higher AISD compared to less exposed fossil fuel firms, non-
fossil fuel firms, and themselves before 2015. 
To give a feeling about the magnitude of this effect, we first show that the 2-basis point 
increase implies an increase in the total cost of the loan with a mean amount and maturity (of 
USD 19 million and 4 years) by around USD 0.2 million. Then, we hand collect data on the 
dollar value of fossil fuel reserves and find that the mean fossil fuel firm in our sample holds 
approximately USD 4,679 million of such reserves. Thus, it seems unlikely that the 
corresponding increase that we identify in the post-2015 period covers the potential losses from 
stranded assets. 
We further investigate this finding by using the actual value of the holdings of proved 
fossil fuel reserves, instead of simply examining average differences between the fossil fuel and 
non-fossil fuel firms. Retaining the dichotomy between the pre-2015 and post-2015 periods, we 
find that a one standard deviation increase in our measure of climate policy exposure implies an 
AISD that is higher by approximately 16 basis points for the fossil firm with mean proved 
reserves scaled by total firm assets in the post-2015 period vs. the non-fossil fuel firm. This 
implies an increase in the total cost of borrowing for the mean loan by USD 1.5 million. This 
extra cost of borrowing represents salient evidence that banks are aware of the climate policy 
issue and started pricing the relevant risk post-2015. 
The results on the all-in-spread-undrawn (AISU) reveal similar (albeit not fully robust) 
evidence for higher facility and commitment fees to fossil fuel firms; however, the economic 
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effect is again too small not to be concerned about a carbon bubble. We also conduct several 
other robustness tests related to the location of reserves (in one versus multiple countries), our 
measure of fossil fuel reserves, the mix of control variables and fixed effects used, etc. 
Moreover, we look into the role of loan maturity, given the potential higher importance of 
environmental policy risk for long-term loans. We find that the role of loan maturity either in the 
loan-pricing equations or as dependent variable (i.e., examining the direct effect of climate 
policy exposure on loan maturity) is very small. We document two last interesting findings. First, 
we show a tendency of fossil fuel firms to obtain slightly larger loans compared to non-fossil fuel 
firms when environmental policy becomes more stringent. Even though the respective increase 
in loan amounts is economically rather small, our finding is in line with a substitution effect due 
to higher environmental policy risk from “lost” access to equity finance toward bank credit. 
Second, we document a slightly higher loan pricing to fossil fuel firms by “green banks” (i.e., 
those participating in the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative) when 
climate policy risk increases. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we further motivate our paper 
based on the existing qualitative literature and show that the existing academic literature is quite 
distant from identifying a carbon bubble in the lending market. In section 3, we discuss our data 
set and the empirical model, with an emphasis on our identification method. In section 4, we 
analyze our empirical results and section 5 concludes. 
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2. Context, motivation and existing literature 
2.1. A carbon bubble?  
Researchers and most policy makers identify climate change as anthropogenic (IPCC 2014). 
Economic and population growth in the industrial era has caused extreme increases in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which are identified as the main source of the observed global 
warming (IPCC 2014). Since 1750, the major fraction of anthropogenic GHG emissions is 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to the atmosphere and half of those have been emitted during 
the last 40 years. 
The IPCC (2014) evaluates future impacts of emission scenarios with different 
temperature rises until 2100. Changes in global mean surface temperature up to the mid-21st 
century are similar for all considered scenarios in the absence of any major extreme weather 
events. However, from the mid-21st century onward, the global temperature, extreme weather 
events, and the sea level depend substantially on the choice of the emission path. The panel 
further identifies an almost linear dependency of global warming in 2100 on cumulative CO2 
emissions. 
In December 2015, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) established the Paris Climate Agreement to limit the rise in global warming to 2°C 
compared to pre-industrial levels by the end of the century and further put forward an even more 
ambitious limit of 1.5°C. Limiting global warming to 2°C above pre-industrial temperature 
requires massive reductions in CO2 emissions in the next decades and near zero overall GHG 
emissions from the next century onward. To meet the 2°C limit in 2100 with a probability larger 
than 66%, the total cumulative emissions must not exceed 2900 gigatonnes CO2 (GtCO2). By 
2011 already about 1900 GtCO2 have been emitted, leaving a budget of about 1000 GtCO2 for 
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the remaining 89 years (IPCC 2014). For comparison, combusting all of the remaining 
(ultimately recoverable) fossil fuel resources would lead to emissions of nearly 11,000 GtCO2, 
while the combustion of current reserves (recoverable under current economic conditions) would 
lead to nearly 2900 GtCO2 (McGlade and Ekins 2015). 
The limiting of total carbon emissions will leave the majority of fossil fuel reserves as 
“stranded assets”. That is, companies owing fossil fuel will not be able to use most of their 
reserves. The Carbon Tracker Initiative (2011; 2013) is the first effort to estimate the amount of 
stranded assets of listed companies based on the global carbon budget from 2000-2050, resulting 
from limiting global warming to 2°C above the pre-industrial level. The findings show that 60% 
to 80% of current carbon reserves of listed firms will become stranded assets. Similarly, 
McGlade and Ekins (2015) estimate that 33% to 35% of current global oil reserves, 49% to 52% 
of current global gas reserves, and 82% to 88% of global coal reserves will be unusable. The 
large fraction of potentially unburnable fossil fuels poses risks of substantial financial losses to 
fossil fuel companies. 
Despite the big fraction of potentially stranded assets, the Carbon Tracker Initiative 
(2013) further highlights that listed oil, gas, and coal companies still largely invest into locating 
and developing new fossil fuel reserves. This ongoing investment, together with the already large 
fraction of potentially stranded assets, suggests that the risks of stranded fossil fuels due to 
climate policies might be inaccurately priced by markets. Further, fossil fuel companies 
themselves find it "highly unlikely" that carbon emissions are cut to reach the 2°C target by 2050 
(ExxonMobil 2014, 16). Therefore, financial markets might carry a carbon bubble, i.e., an 
overvaluation of fossil fuel reserves and related assets due to neglecting the possibility of those 
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assets becoming unusable or “unburnable”, especially under the target of limiting global 
warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. 
 
2.2. Existing empirical literature and the cost of loans 
Empirical evidence on the existence of a carbon bubble is limited. In stark contrast, the potential 
effect of a carbon bubble on financial stability is vigorously discussed by researchers (Weyzig, 
Kuepper, van Gelder, and van Tilburg 2014; Schoenmaker, van Tilburg, and Wijffels 2015; 
Batten, Sowerbutts, and Tanaka 2016) and increasingly enters the agenda of regulators and 
supervisors (Bank of England 2015; Carney 2015; ESRB 2016). Thus, while discussing potential 
implications of a carbon bubble, the clarification of the existence and the extent of a carbon 
bubble are essential. 
As one of the first, HSBC (2013) estimate the value-at-risk (VaR) from stranded assets of 
six oil and gas companies (Shell, BP, Total, Statoil, Eni, and BG). They measure unburnable 
assets according to their costs using data from Wood Mackenzie and show that the fraction of 
stranded assets varies among those companies. The VaR of stranded assets is calculated by 
aggregating the values of all unburnable projects. They show that a moderate reduction in the oil 
and gas demand could reduce the firms' equity value by 40% to 60% due to stranded oil and by 
6% to 9% due to stranded gas reserves. 
The event study by Batten, Sowerbutts, and Tanaka (2016) analyzes the market reaction 
to climate change news that covers the period 2011-2016. They classify an event as a news story 
in a major newspaper or energy-specific investment press, which contains the words “carbon 
bubble”, “unburnable carbon”, or “fossil fuel divestment”. They find a positive and significant 
effect on the abnormal return for renewable energy companies, and a negative but insignificant 
effect on the abnormal return of oil and gas companies. They suggest that the insignificant effect 
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could result from investors’ difficulties to assess credible future climate policies and their impact 
on the carbon-intense sectors. 
Similarly, Byrd and Cooperman (2016) use as events announcements (between 2011 and 
2015) concerning developments in the Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies. They 
find a positive and significant effect on the stock price from breakthroughs in CCS 
developments. However, setbacks in CCS technologies have a negative but insignificant effect 
on abnormal returns of the coal companies. The authors conclude that, either investors already 
price in the potential risk of climate-related stranded fossil fuels, or investors believe that 
governments would never limit the production of coal. 
Carbon-intense sectors are largely debt financed, implying that the impact of stranded 
fossil fuels can easily spill over to the banking sector. This almost naturally generates a question 
on whether banks consider the risk that fossil fuel reserves will become stranded when 
originating or extending credit to fossil fuel firms. Essentially, this implies that if banks 
thoroughly consider the risk of climate policy exposure in the pricing of corporate loans, then no 
carbon bubble exists in the credit market. This is the hypothesis we test in this paper. 
 
3. Data and empirical model 
3.1. Data and main variables 
To test the existence of a carbon bubble in the corporate loan market we use syndicated loans 
from Dealscan. These data are ideal because they provide information on new large loan 
facilities from large well-informed banks to large firms for which industry SIC codes are 
available. The loan pricing decisions in a loan syndicate are taken by lead banks (lead arrangers), 
who are liable to other participant banks for their decisions and thus bear reputational costs if 
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they misprice loans. Thus, if anything, and despite moral hazard issues in the formation of the 
syndicate (Sufi 2007; Ivashina 2009), we expect that identifying a carbon bubble in the 
syndicated loans market, would probably imply that the bubble will be bigger in other smaller 
corporate loans. 
 We consider only loan facilities with information on loan spreads. In total, we have a 
cross-section of 72,742 loans in the period 2007-2016, but this number will be lower in our 
empirical analysis given data availability mainly on variables reflecting fossil fuel reserves. We 
match loans to firm-year accounting data from Compustat to identify general risk and 
performance indicators of firms. We provide detailed definitions of all variables in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Our main outcome variable is the so called all-in-spread-drawn, AISD, which equals the 
spread of the loan facility over LIBOR plus any facility fee. Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) 
show the importance of fees in the overall pricing of loans. Thus, in robustness checks, we use 
the all-in-spread-undrawn (AISU) as dependent variable to assess the impact of climate policy 
exposure on fees. The AISU is the sum of the facility fee and the commitment fee.
1
 
Ideally, our main explanatory variable illustrating climate policy exposure would be the 
amount of stranded assets of a fossil fuel firm f in year t. However, such estimates are only given 
as snap shots in time (Carbon Tracker Initiative 2011, 2013, McGlade and Ekins 2015). In 
principle, a devaluation of fossil fuel reserves can be caused due to changes in regulation 
(policies), technologies or carbon prices. Climate policies involve direct environmental 
regulations, e.g., pollution outputs and inputs, as well as stimulating the development of 
alternative technologies, by, e.g., subsidizing instruments. The probability of stranded fossil fuel 
                                                 
1 Due to lack of information for several countries, we cannot utilize other types of fees, such as the utilization fee 
(paid on the drawn amount once a threshold has been exceeded), or cancellation and upfront fees. 
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reserves is thus higher in countries with higher climate policy stringency. Therefore, we can 
proxy the risk of stranded fossil fuel reserves by the risk of climate policies stringency, i.e., 
whether a country places considerable effort in climate change policies. That is, a fossil fuel firm 
owing exploration rights for reserves in a country with strict climate policy faces a higher 
probability of reserves being stranded than a firm with fossil fuel reserves in a country with loose 
climate policy. 
This also implies that we require information on the total amount of fossil fuel reserves of 
firms across countries. As these data are not readily available in conventional databases, we 
hand-collect them from firms’ annual reports. To get the most comprehensive data, we only 
consider the amount of proved oil and gas reserves and proven and probable coal reserves.
2
 
Proved oil and gas reserves are “the estimated quantities of oil and gas, which, by analysis of 
geoscience and engineering data, can be estimated with “reasonable certainty” to be 
economically producible from a given date forward, from known reservoirs, and under existing 
economic conditions, operating methods, and government regulations” (US Security and 
Exchange Commission-SEC).
3
 We convert the amount of coal, gas, and oil reserves into barrels 
of oil-equivalent according to common approximate conversion factors.
4
 
A further problem is that large firms could hold fossil fuel reserves in more than one 
country or even exploit loose policies of countries to move their exploration activities there. To 
                                                 
2 SEC uses the term "proved reserves" for oil and gas reserves and "proven" reserves for coal reserves. In the 
remainder of the paper, we use the term "proved reserves" for all kinds of reserves (oil, gas, and coal). 
3 Similarly, proven coal reserves are “reserves for which (a) quantity is computed from dimensions revealed in 
outcrops, trenches, workings or drill holes; grade and/or quality are computed from the results of detailed sampling 
and (b) the sites for inspection, sampling and measurement are spaced so closely and the geologic character is so 
well defined that size, shape, depth and mineral content of reserves are well-established.” Probable coal reserves are 
“reserves for which quantity and grade and/or quality are computed form information similar to that used for proven 
(measure) reserves, but the sites for inspection, sampling, and measurement are farther apart or are otherwise less 
adequately spaced. The degree of assurance, although lower than that for proven (measured) reserves, is high 
enough to assume continuity between points of observation” (US Security and Exchange Commission-SEC). 
4 See additional material to BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2017, 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2017/bp-statistical-
review-of%20world%20energy-2017-approximate-conversion-factors.pdf, accessed June 29, 2017. 
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capture the differences in the firms’ allocation of fossil fuel reserves by country, we first hand-
collect data (from firms’ annual reports) on the location of these assets. Then, we define the 
climate policy exposure of a firm f in year t as: 
 ܥ݈݅݉ܽݐ݁	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ	݁ݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௙௧ ൌ ∑ ܴ݈݁ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ݎ݁ݏ݁ݎݒ݁ݏ௙௖௧	 ൈ	ܥ݈݅݉ܽݐ݁	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ	݅݊݀݁ݔ௖௧	௖ ,  (1) 
 
In equation (1) Relative reserves is the relative amount of fossil fuel reserves of firm f in country 
c in year t. 
In turn, Climate policy index is the climate policy index of country c in year t. A thorough 
measure of a country’s climate policy stringency should include both its climate policy ambition 
and its climate policy effort. The former is measured by the efficiency in climate policy 
implementation while the latter is measured by climate policy outcomes such as CO2 emissions. 
There are two such indices available for our analysis.
5
 The first is the Climate Change 
Cooperation Index (C3I) by Bernauer and Böhmelt (2013). The C3I evaluates countries’ overall 
climate policy performance, as well as performance in terms of political behavior (output) and 
emissions (outcome). Currently, the index covers the period 1996-2014 for up to 172 countries, 
and takes values between 0 and 100 (inclusive) with higher values indicating stricter climate 
policy (more climate-friendly countries). An alternative is the Climate Change Performance 
Index (CCPI) by Germanwatch (Burck, Hermwille, and Bals 2016).
6
 This index, available for the 
                                                 
5 An alternative measure is the OECD’s Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) index (Botta and Kozluk 2014). 
However, the EPS index primarily considers policies in the energy sector, especially policies applying to electricity 
generation. Stricter policies for the electricity sector of a country do not necessarily affect fossil fuel reserves in that 
country. Therefore, the EPS index is not a good proxy for the risk of stranded fossil fuel reserves. 
6 The publicly available CCPI time series includes changes in weightings within the sample period; however, we 
have received a CCPI data set by Germanwatch that is based on a uniform weighting method introduced in 2013 and 
covers the period 2007-2017. The CCPI comprises of fifteen measures that are classified into the five categories, 
namely Emissions Level, Development of Emissions, Efficiency, Renewable Energies, and Climate Policy. 80% of 
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period 2007-2017 and covering 58 countries, takes values on the interval [0,100], with higher 
values reflecting higher climate policy effort by countries. The countries covered produce the 
majority of global energy-related CO2 emissions. As analyzed by Bernauer and Böhmelt (2013) 
the two climate policy indices are positively correlated and useful empirical measures. 
Based on the above, a higher Climate policy exposure indicates a higher average level of 
fossil fuel reserves in countries with stricter climate policy. 
 
3.2. Empirical identification and control variables 
We estimate the effect of a firm’s Climate policy exposure on the cost of loans, using an 
empirical model of the following form: 
 ܥܮ௟௕௙௧ ൌ ܽ ൅ ܽଵܨ݋ݏݏ݈݅ܨݑ݈݁௙௧ ൅ ܽଶܥ݈݅݉ܽݐ݁	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ	݁ݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௙௧+ (2) 
 ܽଷܨ݋ݏݏ݈݅ܨݑ݈݁௙௧ ൈ ܥ݈݅݉ܽݐ݁	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ	݁ݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௙௧ ൅ ܽସܮ௟௧ ൅ ܽହܨ௙௧ ൅ ݑ௟௕௙௧ 
 
 In equation (2), CL is the cost (AISD or AISU) of a loan facility. The loan is given by lead 
bank(s) b of the syndicate to firm f in year t. FossilFuel is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm 
f owns fossil fuel reserves in year t and 0 otherwise. As an alternative to FossilFuel, we can use 
the dollar value of proved reserves scaled for firm size (named Proved Reserves over Total 
Assets) but we reserve this for sensitivity tests, as it is hard to calculate these reserves for coal 
firms. L and F are vectors of loan and firm-year characteristics that might affect the cost of loans. 
Further, a is a vector of fixed effects and ݑ is the remainder disturbance. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the measures are based on objective indicators and 20% on national and international climate policy assessments 
from about 300 experts from the respective countries. 
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At the loan-level, we control for the loan amount, the maturity of the loan facility, 
whether a loan has collateral, the number of lenders in the syndicate, whether a loan has 
performance pricing provisions, the number of general covenants, and a number of dummy 
variables that indicate the loan type and the purpose of the loan. Moreover, we control for the 
effect of unobserved loan-specific characteristics using loan type and loan purpose fixed effects. 
Typical control variables of borrowing firms that affect the cost of loans are firm size, market-to-
book ratio, leverage, and tangibility. At the country-level, we control for borrower's country 
GDP per capita and the GDP growth rate. For definitions of these variables, see Table 1; for 
similar control variables in loan pricing equations, see e.g., Ivashina (2009) and Delis, Hasan, 
and Ongena (2017). 
If the terms of lending are affected by the risk of fossil fuel reserves to become 
unburnable, then we should observe ܽଷ ൐ Ͳ. That is, firms with a larger average exposure to 
climate-policy stringency face a higher risk that their fossil fuel reserves become stranded. 
Consequently, if banks price in this risk, firms with larger average exposure should face higher 
cost of loans. Thus, our model compares the terms of lending of fossil fuel firms to other firms 
that bear no risk of stranded reserves and the risk of fossil fuel reserves to become stranded 
based on the exposure to country-specific climate-policy stringency. 
A potential identification issue in equation (2) could be the presence of an omitted-
variable bias emerging from other risk characteristics of banks and firms. First, it might be that 
the time-varying supply-side policies of banks drive the results. The fact that in our data every 
lead bank gives multiple loans within a year, allows using bank*year fixed effects, which 
saturate the model from supply-side explanations of the findings. Considering demand-side 
potential omitted variables, the usual time-varying firm-specific measures of risk and 
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performance, along with the use of the interaction term, mitigate such concerns. Thus, along with 
the fielding of our model with firm-year indicators of risk and performance, it is unlikely that 
coefficient a3 would capture anything other than a shift due to climate policy exposure of fossil 
fuel firms vis-à-vis other firms. 
If we identify an effect, this should be more pronounced in the recent years in which 
environmental policy intensified and the notion of a carbon bubble appeared. Thus, in a more 
stringent identification method, we can distinguish the periods before and after 2011, which is 
the first year that the term carbon bubble appeared (Le Page, 2011; Carbon Tracker Initiative 
report, 2011). This implies a specification, where the triple interaction between FossilFuel, 
Climate policy exposure, and Post2011 (along with relevant double interactions) enters our 
estimated model. Post2011 takes the value 0 before 2012 and the value 1 from 2012 onward.  
The model takes the form: 
 					ܥܮ௟௕௙௧ ൌ ܽᇱ௕௧൅	ܽᇱଵܮ௟௧ ൅ ܽᇱଶܨ௙௧ ൅൅ܽᇱଷܨ݋ݏݏ݈݅ܨݑ݈݁௙௧ ൅ ܽᇱସܲ݋ݏݐʹͲͳͳ௧ ൅ 
 ܽᇱହܥ݈݅݉ܽݐ݁	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ	݁ݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௙௧ ൅ ܽ′଺	ܨ݋ݏݏ݈݅ܨݑ݈݁௙௧ ൈ ܲ݋ݏݐʹͲͳͳ௧ ൅ 
 ܽᇱ଻ܨ݋ݏݏ݈݅ܨݑ݁ ௙݈௧ ൈ ܥ݈݅݉ܽݐ݁	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ	݁ݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௙௧ ൅ ܽᇱ଼ܲ݋ݏݐʹͲͳͳ௧ ൈܥ݈݅݉ܽݐ݁	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ	݁ݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௙௧ ൅ 	ܽᇱଽܨ݋ݏݏ݈݅ܨݑ݈݁௙௧ ൈ ܲ݋ݏݐʹͲͳͳ௧ ൈܥ݈݅݉ܽݐ݁	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ	݁ݔ݌݋ݏݑݎ݁௙௧ ൅ ݑᇱ௟௕௙௧ (3) 
 
This approach compares, in the pre- and post-2011 periods, the terms of lending of fossil fuel to 
non-fossil fuel firms based on their climate policy exposure. Because the notion of a carbon 
bubble has publicly emerged, we should observe that financial intermediaries increasingly factor 
post-2011 the risk of fossil fuel reserves to become unburnable into the terms of lending of these 
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firms (relative to non-fossil fuel firms). That is we should observe ܽ′ଽ ൐ Ͳ. In further tests, we 
include equivalent triple interactions with post-2012 and post-2013 dummies. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Summary statistics and anecdotal evidence 
We provide basic summary statistics of our data set in Table 2 for the period 2007 to 2016. The 
mean C3I is 54.80 and the mean CCPI 42.11. Overall, we have fossil fuel reserves data for 217 
fossil fuel firms, of which 25 operate in the coal-mining sector, and our reserves data covers 2/3 
of the listed fossil fuel firms in the Dealscan data set. Moreover, in Table A.1 we provide 
summary statistics on the firms’ relative amount of fossil fuel reserves by country. As 
highlighted in these statistics, in the period 2007-2016 firms in our sample own fossil fuel 
reserves in 59 different countries, with each firm owning fossil fuel reserves in 1.39 countries on 
average. Table A.2 reports fossil fuel firms’ country of headquarter and Table A.3 lists all fossil 
fuel firms in our sample that own oil, gas, and coal reserves. Table A.4 reports summary 
statistics for the C3I for countries in which firms in our sample own fossil fuel reserves in the 
period 2007-2014. Table A.5 provides the equivalent for the CCPI over the period 2007-2016. 
The evolution over time of the two climate policy indices is illustrated in Figure A.1 for eight 
representative countries. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Figure 1 illustrates the relation of the firms’ climate policy exposure and AISD and Figure 
2 the respective between climate policy exposure and AISU. The results do not reflect a strong 
correlation between climate policy risk and each of the measures of the cost of credit. In what 
follows, we aim to examine causal effects. 
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[Insert Figures 1 & 2 about here] 
 
4.2. Empirical results 
We first use the C3I and the period 2007-2014 and report the results in Table 3. All 
specifications control for loan type and loan purpose fixed effects as well as for supply-side 
effects using bank*year fixed effects. To exclude a potential effect of bad controls, specification 
(1) includes only loan characteristics, specification (2) firm and macro controls, and specification 
(3) our full set of controls. All specifications yield very similar inferences. Based on the 
specification (3), being a fossil fuel firm does not imply a significantly higher cost of credit. 
Further, throughout specifications (1) to (3), the interaction term between FossilFuel and Climate 
Policy Exposure is statistically insignificant,
7
 implying no differential effect of climate policy 
risk on the cost of credit between fossil fuel (treated) and non-fossil fuel (control) firms. The 
findings remain unchanged when we include bank’s country, time, and firm’s country fixed 
effects in specification (4). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In Table 4, we replicate the results of Table 3 using the CCPI to measure country policy 
risk. The results are somewhat different in that the main term of Fossil Fuel is positive and 
statistically significant across all specifications (i.e., irrespective of using different controls 
and/or fixed effects). This finding is intuitive because especially oil and gas projects are capital 
intensive and have long lead times. Further, the exploration of oil and gas is inherently risky, 
with an average exploration success of approximately 33% (Tordo, Johnston, and Johnston, 
2010). However, we still do not find that this effect is due to climate policy risk, as the 
interaction term between FossilFuel and Climate Policy Exposure is statistically insignificant. In 
                                                 
7 The main term of Climate Policy Exposure drops out due to multicollinearity. 
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sum, our results so far are indicative of a carbon bubble, as banks in our full sample period did 
not price in the climate policy exposure of fossil fuel firms and the possibility that fossil fuel 
reserves will become stranded. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The debate on climate policy risk carried by fossil fuel firms has arisen toward the end of 
our sample period. Using equation (3), we therefore examine whether a fossil fuel firm’s 
exposure to climate policy risk affects its cost of borrowing after the emergence of the notion of 
a carbon bubble. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 report the results when focusing on the period 
directly following the emergence of the carbon bubble discussion in 2011. The interaction term 
FossilFuel×Post2011×Climate policy exposure captures the difference in cost of credit due to a 
fossil fuel firms’ climate policy exposure after 2011. As there might be a time lag until the notion 
of the carbon bubble reached a wider audience, in specifications (3) and (4) we consider the 
equivalent effect post 2012; and in specifications (5) and (6) post 2013. However, our results on 
the triple interaction terms do not identify a significant relation between climate policy exposure 
and the firm’s costs of credit in the years after the emergence of the notion of the carbon bubble. 
In Table 6, we use the CCPI to measure climate policy exposure. As the CCPI covers the 
period 2007 to 2017, we can extend the time window of our analysis to include the most recent 
years. Again, specifications (1) and (2) report the results just after the emergence of the notion of 
a carbon bubble in 2011; in columns (3) and (4) we use 2013 as the threshold year; and in 
columns (5) and (6), we use 2015. The first four specifications yield once more insignificant 
estimates on the triple interaction term. However, in the post-2015 period, there is a positive and 
significant effect (at the 10% level). This is the first evidence that banks started pricing in the 
climate policy exposure of fossil fuel firms from 2015 onward. Interestingly, 2015 coincides 
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with the Paris Agreement and the denser series of reports and academic articles on the carbon 
bubble until that time (Dyer, 2015; Jacob and Hilaire, 2015; McGlade and Ekins, 2015; King et 
al., 2015). 
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here] 
 This analysis by itself does not provide evidence for or against a carbon bubble. To 
inquire into this, we hand-collect data on the dollar value of proved reserves. Essentially, Proved 
Reserves is the standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows related to proved oil 
and gas reserves (see Table 1). As shown in Table 2, the mean Proved Reserves for the firms in 
our sample equals 4,679.24 million USD. At the same time, column (6) of Table 6 documents 
that a one standard-deviation increase in Climate Policy Exposure yields a 2 basis-point increase 
in the cost of loans to fossil fuel firms relative to firms with stable CCPI and non-fossil fuel firms 
in the post-2015 period. Based on this estimate and the statistics reported in Table 2.b, for the 
loan with the mean amount and maturity, this implies an increase in the total cost by 
approximately USD 188,628 (calculated from 0.0002×258,395,004.4×3.65).
8
 Comparing the 
increase in the cost of loans to fossil fuel firms with the mean Proved Reserves, it seems unlikely 
that this extra cost covers the potential losses from stranded assets. 
Could it be that an increased cost of borrowing is hiding in the loan fees and not the 
spreads? Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016) note the importance of fees in syndicate loan 
pricing. Even though information on fees in the global syndicate sample is limited, we do have 
some information on AISU. Figure 2 illustrates the relation of the loan’s AISU and the exposure 
to climate policy but, as in Figure 1, we do not observe a strong relation between the two 
variables. 
                                                 
8 This is derived from the 2 basis points (=0.0002) and the inverse logarithms of the loan amount and loan maturity 
(in years=3.65), respectively. 
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We then replicate our baseline regression analysis using AISU as dependent variable and 
report the results in Table 7. From this point onward, we use the CCPI given its availability for 
the most recent period. The estimates on the interaction term are statistically insignificant. These 
results are not driven by the smaller sample: redoing our baseline analysis on AISD and the 
sample where AISU is non-missing, yields very similar results with those of Tables 3 and 4 (the 
interaction term between FossilFuel and Climate Policy Exposure is statistically insignificant). 
We can conclude that there is no evidence that climate policy risk matters in terms of higher 
commitment and facility fees paid by fossil fuel firms. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
An important alternative specification comes from using Proved Reserves over Total 
Assets instead of FossilFuel. Proved Reserves are the standardized measure of discounted future 
net cash flow from proved oil and gas reserves (see Table 1). The advantage of this approach is 
that we have a continuous measure for fossil fuel reserves and thus we do not simply treat all 
fossil fuel firms similarly with a dummy variable: firms owning more such reserves are more 
exposed to climate policy risk. The disadvantage of this measure is that we have limited 
information for coal firms. 
As we do not identify any evidence for a significant double interaction term when 
estimating equation (2), we focus on the results from equation (3) and especially those for the 
post-2015 period. We report them in Table 8. Our findings reinforce those of Table 6 (the triple 
interaction is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level) but provide a clearer picture on 
the economic significance of differential pricing based on the actual amount of fossil fuel 
reserves. Specifically, based on column (4), a one standard deviation increase in Climate Policy 
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Exposure implies a higher AISD by approximately 16 basis points for the fossil firm with mean 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets in the post-2015 period vs. the non-fossil fuel firm. 
Working in the same way as in Table 6, this implies an increase in the total cost of 
borrowing by USD 1,517,295. If we alternatively take the marginal effect with respect to Proved 
Reserves over Total Assets, we find that only a 1% point increase in these reserves implies a 6.9 
basis points increase in AISD, or USD 650,768. 
Concisely, the analysis of Table 8 indicates a considerably higher cost of borrowing for 
fossil fuel firms due to either increased climate policy exposure or increase in the actual amount 
of fossil fuel reserves. Despite the fact that this extra cost of borrowing is still small compared to 
the mean Proved Reserves of fossil fuel firms in our sample (equal to 4,679.24 million USD), the 
analysis of Table 8 provides the first salient evidence that banks are aware of the climate policy 
issue and start pricing the relevant risk, especially for firms that own a large portfolio of proved 
reserves. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 To ensure that our results hold for oil and gas reserves (for which we have the cleanest 
data on proved reserves) and are not driven by coal reserves, we repeat the analysis of Table 8 
only for the relevant firms. The results in Table 9 are almost identical to those in Table 8. 
Replicating Tables 4 to 6, using oil and gas reserves, also produces very similar results (available 
on request). We conduct further robustness tests on our baseline results in the next section. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
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4.3. Other sensitivity tests 
We conduct several sensitivity tests and report the results in the Appendix. So far, we focused on 
firms that disclose their fossil fuel reserves at the country level. However, this automatically 
excludes some of the well-known fossil fuel firms (e.g., Shell, ExxonMobil), which typically 
operate worldwide and only disclose their aggregate fossil fuel reserves at a regional level. We 
conduct a sensitivity test to include these firms in our sample by splitting the regional reserves 
equally to each country of the region.
9
 In general, our findings are in line with our baseline 
results (results available on request), indicating a small increase in the cost of loans for fossil fuel 
firms relative to other firms in the post-2015 period. Moreover, in our main analysis, we use 
proved reserves and exclude “probable oil and gas reserves.” Probable reserves are “those 
additional reserves that are less certain to be recovered than proved reserves but which, together 
with proved reserves, are as likely as not to be recovered” (US Security and Exchange 
Commission-SEC). Once more, our inferences are very similar to that of the baseline results 
(results available on request). 
We also examine whether our findings are in fact due to general political and policy 
uncertainty in the countries examined, and not due to climate policy uncertainty in particular. We 
measure political instability using the State Fragility Index (SFI) from the Center for Systemic 
Peace, which measures countries’ effectiveness and legitimacy in managing conflicts and their 
ability to implement public policies. The SFI varies between 0 (no fragility) to 25 (extreme 
                                                 
9 For instance, Royal Dutch Shell Plc discloses its 2014 proved reserves at a continental level, for Europe, Asia, 
Oceania, Africa, USA, Canada, and South America. In Europe, Shell estimates total proved reserves of 2,728 
million barrels of oil equivalents and further reports its upstream operations in Europe to take place in 10 countries 
(Albania, Denmark, Germany, Greenland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and Ukraine). Therefore, for 
Shell we assign 272.8 million barrels of oil equivalents (dividing the total reserves in Europe by the number of 
European countries in which Shell operates) to each of the 10 European countries in which it operates. Table A.3b 
reports the additional firms used in the extended data set. Firms that disclose fossil fuel reserves by region own 
reserves in up to 36 countries. Proved Reserves over Total Assets are not available for any of the additional firms; 
thus, there is no change over the results in Table 8. 
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fragility). Table A.6 reports the results as in Table 8, introducing triple interactions with the SFI 
in the fashion of (and in addition to) the triple interactions with the CCPI. The results document 
an insignificant triple interaction with the SFI and, if anything, make the triple interaction term 
involving the CCPI economically more potent. 
Finally, we use an alternative measure of public attention/awareness of the risk of 
stranded fossil fuel reserves (compared to simply using the pre-post-2015 variation). 
Specifically, we use a Google-search of the term “carbon bubble” to infer public awareness on 
this issue. We also experiment with the terms “stranded carbon” and “unburnable carbon” but 
these are used more infrequently. Via Google Trends,
10
 Google provides the Search Volume 
Index (SVI) of search terms and divides the search frequency data by the total search in the 
region and time period. The resulting time series is scaled on a range of 0 to 100 by the search 
term’s popularity compared to all other searches. For our analysis, we match our data with the 
monthly time series from 2007 to 2016 of the Search Volume Index corresponding to the 
keywords. Figure A.2 shows the evolution of the resulting index over time. 
We find statistically significant results on the triple interaction between the SVI of the 
term carbon bubble, the CCPI, and Proved Reserves over Total Assets (results in Table A.7). The 
positive triple interaction term is intuitive, indicating an increase in the cost of credit for fossil 
fuel firms with higher CCPI and public awareness of the carbon bubble issue. Taking the 
derivative of column (4) with respect to Attention and holding CCPI and Proved Reserves over 
Total Assets at their mean levels, we find that a unitary increase in attention increases AISD by 
approximately 1.2 basis points. Thus, the response is economically small. 
  
                                                 
10 http://www.google.com/trends. 
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4.4. A role for loan maturity? 
In this section, we consider the role of loan maturity in both the relation between climate policy 
exposure and loan pricing and as an outcome variable of climate policy exposure. Our premise is 
that loans with a relatively long maturity will bear higher environmental policy risk for the 
banks, because of the underlying uncertainty on relevant policy innovations in the more distant 
future. The mean maturity in the full sample is 48.4 months and for the fossil fuel firms 43.8 
months. 
 We first examine loan-pricing equations, where we use only loans with maturity longer 
than four years. We choose four years as a cutoff to focus on loans with a maturity longer than 
the usual tenure of legislative bodies around the world and thus more prone to political 
uncertainty.
11
 Table A.8 (Appendix) reports specifications equivalent to those in Table 4. Our 
findings show that, similarly to the loans with a mean maturity, loans with longer maturity are 
not assigned higher prices due to environmental policy risk. The results are quite similar when 
we use Proved Reserves over Total Assets instead of the FossilFuel dummy (Table A.9). When 
repeating the analysis for the rest of our baseline results (e.g., for the C3I), we again draw very 
similar inferences. These findings further support that, at least before 2015, banks did not 
incorporate climate policy risk in their loan pricing decisions.
12
  
Second, we examine loan maturity equations. We hypothesize that banks might react to 
climate policy risk, not by increasing loan spreads and facility fees, but by reducing loan 
maturity. To this end, we construct a binary variable, named Short Maturity, which equals one if 
                                                 
11 We also examine the same specifications using loans with maturity longer than five years, without observing 
substantial differences. 
12 Unfortunately, we need to wait at least two years to conduct the analysis on the loans with long maturity for the 
pre-post 2015 periods. 
25 
 
Maturity ≤ four years (48 months) and zero otherwise.13 As we mainly identify differential 
pricing of bank loans in the post-2015 period (compared to the pre-2015 period) based on the 
ratio of fossil-fuel reserves over total assets, we resort to specifications equivalent to Table 8, but 
with Short Maturity as dependent variable. We estimate the model using a linear probability 
model, which we favor over a probit model because of the inclusion of multiple fixed effects.
14
 
Table 10 reports the results. The triple interaction term between Reserves over Assets, 
Post 2015, and CCPI is statistically insignificant across all specifications. Overall, we do not 
identify a strong role for loan maturity in lending to fossil fuel firms. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
4.5. Climate risk awareness and the effect of fossil fuel firm’s capital structure 
A hypothesis that relates to empirical findings from the tobacco industry (e.g., part of the 
analysis of Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009) suggests that if investors start taking the risk of 
stranded fossil fuel reserves into account or even avoiding investments in the fossil fuel sector, 
fossil fuel firms need to switch to other financing sources. Fossil fuel firms will then need to 
increase their credit volume to make up for the “lost” access to equity finance. The effect should 
be more pronounced for fossil fuel firms that are highly exposed to climate policy risk. To test 
this hypothesis, we replicate the results of Table 4, using loan amount as the dependent variable. 
We report the results in Table 11 and find that the interaction term between FossilFuel and the 
CCPI is positive and significant at the 1% level across all specifications. Based on specification 
(4), a one standard deviation increase in the CCPI, increases the loan amount of fossil fuel firms 
by 0.00945 (1.05×0.009), which is economically a very small effect. Thus, it will take 
                                                 
13 Simply using Maturity as the dependent variable produces very similar inferences. 
14 Logit models can accommodate fixed effects. However, with several types of fixed effects, even logit models face 
convergence difficulties. 
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considerable increases in the CCPI to see any economically significant effects on the loan 
amount of fossil fuel firms. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
4.6. Green banks vs. non-green banks 
In principle, “environmentally-friendly” or “green banks” (i.e., those aligning their business 
strategy with environmental/climate principles) should also demand a larger compensation for 
the risk of stranded fossil fuels. We use bank membership in the United Nations Environment 
Programme Finance Initiative as a proxy for banks’ attitude toward environmental and climate 
change issues. This is a global partnership between United Nations and the financial sector, 
aiming to understand the effect of environmental and social considerations on financial 
performance. Over 200 members (banks, insurers, and fund managers) have joined the 
initiative.
15
 We define a dummy variable (named Participation Green Principles), taking the 
value one from the year onward in which a bank signed the initiative, and zero otherwise.
16
 
In the specifications of Table 12, we examine the role of banks’ greenness using a triple 
interaction between FossilFuel, the CCPI, and Participation Green Principles.
17
 We expect that 
this term is positive: green banks should charge higher loan prices to fossil fuel firms that face 
higher environmental policy risk. The estimates of the first three specifications confirm this 
hypothesis, but adding banks’ country fixed effects increases the standard error (without 
significantly affecting the coefficient estimate). The marginal effect of AISD with respect to 
Participation Green Principles, suggests that a one standard deviation increase in that variable 
will increase AISD by approximately 36 basis points. 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
                                                 
15 The list of participating banks is available at http://www.unepfi.org/members/banking/ (Accessed April 2018). 
16 We also experiment with banks that have signed the Equators Principles framework, the results being similar. 
17 Due to data limitations, we cannot redo this exercise using Proved Reserves. 
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5. Conclusions 
We provide the first evidence for the potential existence of a carbon bubble in the corporate loan 
market. Specifically, we study whether banks price-in the risk faced by fossil fuel firms that their 
fossil fuel reserves will become stranded. In turn, if these reserves are stranded, the fossil fuel 
firms will face considerable losses. We draw implications from hand-collected firm-year data on 
the fossil fuel reserves of firms across countries, country-year indices of environmental policy 
stringency (indicating higher climate policy risk), and global syndicated loan data. As relevant 
environmental policy initiatives are recent, our analysis covers the period 2007-2016. 
Our baseline identification method compares the loan pricing of fossil fuel firms to non-
fossil fuel firms and the loan pricing among fossil fuel firms based on their climate policy 
exposure. We strengthen the validity of this model via the fielding of many control variables and 
fixed effects (e.g., loan type and purpose, bank*year, and firms’ country fixed effects). We 
identify further differences in loan pricing, by comparing, in the pre- and post-2015 periods, the 
terms of lending of fossil fuel to non-fossil fuel firms based on their climate policy exposure. 
The year 2015 signals a turning point because of the Paris Agreement and the intensified 
discussion of a carbon bubble. 
 Our results from the full 2007-2016 sample are consistent with a carbon bubble in the 
corporate loan market: we find no evidence that banks charge significantly higher loan spreads to 
fossil fuel firms. We find some evidence for higher loan fees to fossil fuel firms, but even these 
results are economically small and not robust across different specifications. However, when 
looking into the post-2015 period, we find the first evidence that banks increased their loan 
spreads to fossil fuel firms that are significantly exposed to climate policy risk. This is especially 
true when we do not simply compare fossil-fuel firms to non-fossil-fuel firms, but when we 
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compare firms based on the value (relative to firms’ size) of proved reserves. We find that a mere 
1% point increase in proved reserves implies a 6.9 basis points increase in loan spreads, or USD 
0.6 million. For a one standard deviation increase (equal to 0.47) in our measure of proved 
reserves, the increase in spreads is naturally even higher. We also document a direct negative 
effect of climate policy exposure on the maturity of loans to fossil fuel firms in the post-2015 
period. 
 In sum, we provide the first empirical evidence for the financial risk of fossil fuel firms 
vis-à-vis other firms and highlights the importance of a smooth transition to a greener production 
for the financial markets. Future studies should examine whether fossil-fuel firms have indeed 
initiated this transition and how markets in general and banks in particular perceive it. Further, 
an interesting extension of our analysis is to look into the risks and associated loan pricing of 
green firms. We leave these ideas for future research. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and sources
Variable  Description Source 
A. Dependent variables in main specifications 
AISD All-in-spread-drawn, defined as the sum of the spread over LIBOR plus the facility 
fee. 
Dealscan and 
Thomson Reuters 
AISU  All-in-spread-undrawn, defined as the sum of the facility fee and the commitment 
fee. 
idem 
Short Maturity Binary variable which equals one if loan maturity ≤ 2 years and zero otherwise idem 
B. Explanatory Variables: Loan characteristics 
Loan Amount  Log of the loan facility amount in dollars. idem 
Maturity  Log of loan duration in months. idem 
Collateral Dummy equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral, zero otherwise. idem 
Number of Lenders The number of banks involved in the syndicated loan. idem 
Performance Provisions Dummy equal to one if the loan has performance pricing provisions, zero otherwise. idem 
General Covenants The number of covenants in the loan contract. idem 
Loan Type A series of dummy variables indicating loan type (e.g., term loans, revolvers, etc.). idem 
Loan Purpose A series of dummy variables indicating loan purpose (e.g., corporate purpose, debt 
repay, etc.). 
idem 
C. Explanatory variables: Borrower characteristics  
Firm Size Log of total firm assets. Compustat 
Market to Book The ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. idem 
Tangibility The ratio of tangible assets to total assets (multiplied by 100). idem 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets (multiplied by 100). idem 
Profitability The return on equity. idem 
FossilFuel Dummy equal to one if the firm operates in the fossil fuel sector (sic-code 1200-
1400). 
idem 
D. Explanatory variables: Borrower’s country characteristics 
GDP per Capita GDP per capita in current prices. WDI 
GDP Growth Annual GDP growth rate. WDI 
E. Fossil fuel firm’s reserves data 
Fossil Fuel Reserves Fossil fuel firms’ relative amount of oil, gas and coal reserves by countries. Annual reports and 
own calculations 
Proved Reserves (USD)  Standardized measure of discounted future net cash flows related to proved oil and 
gas reserves (in million USD). 
idem 
Climate Policy Exposure The climate policy exposure of fossil fuel firms determined by weighting the 
countries’ climate policy index by the relative amount of a firm’s fossil fuel reserves 
of each firm in each year in that country (see equation 1). As climate policy indices 
we use the C3I and CCPI. 
Annual reports and 
climate policy 
indices 
Political Instability Exposure The political instability exposure of fossil fuel firms determined by weighting the 
countries’ political instability index by the relative amount of a firm’s fossil fuel 
reserves of each firm in each year in that country (similar to equation 1). As political 
instability index we use the SFI. 
Annual reports and  
political instability 
indices 
F. Explanatory variables: Lender characteristics  
Participation Green Principles Dummy equal to one from the year onwards in which the lender signed the green 
principles of the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative. 
Principle’s webpage
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Table 2a 
Summary statistics – whole sample 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
AISD 72,742 280.66 187.35 -370 5,000 
AISU 18,456 37.24 30.35 0.25 625 
Short Maturity 72,742 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Loan Amount 72,742 18.53 1.55 10.35 25.35 
Maturity 72,742 3.88 0.64 0 6.59 
Collateral 72,742 0.00 0.07 0 1 
Number of Lenders 72,742 6.55 6.37 1 141 
Performance Provisions 72,742 0.12 0.32 0 1 
General Covenants 72,742 0.45 0.99 0 6 
Firm Size 23,705 8.72 2.39 -0.25 20.50 
Market to Book 14,896 14.44 676.09 0.23 40,663.91 
Leverage 23,441 33.68 23.28 0 595.49 
Tangibility 21,003 1 6 0 642 
GDP per Capita 68,632 46,548 14,599 210 170,157 
GDP Growth 68,615 2.02 2.31 -21.54 26.28 
Participation Green Principles (EP) 72,742 0.117 0.321 0 1 
Participation Green Principles (UNEPFI) 72,742 0.359 0.480 0 1 
Table 2b 
Summary statistics – subsample: fossil fuel sector 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
AISD 1,942 287.70 194.07 1 1,330 
AISU 706 47.68 35.83 2 500 
Short Maturity 1,942 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Loan Amount 1,942 19.37 1.34 14.20 23.27 
Maturity 1,942 3.78 0.60 0 5.65 
Collateral 1,942 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Number of Lenders 1,942 8.27 7.38 1 60 
Performance Provisions 1,942 0.17 0.38 0 1 
General Covenants 1,942 0.56 1.01 0.00 4.00 
Firm Size 962 8.44 2.64 2.22 17.74 
Market to Book 786 244 2935 0 40,664 
Leverage 961 32 20 0 149 
Tangibility 932 2 2 0 30 
GDP per Capita 1,938 43,911 17,876 856 102,910 
GDP Growth 1,936 2.15 2.53 -7.82 25.05 
Participation Green Principles (UNEPFI) 1,942 0.526 0.499 0 1 
Climate Policy Exposure (C3I) 813 44.22 7.99 31.30 64.77 
Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 769 54.68 1.05 46.56 60.19 
Total Fossil Fuel Reserves (MMBOE) 803 1,965.326 5,755.305 0.002 46,400 
Proved Reserves (million USD) 623 4,679.24 12,240.5 5.33 137,896 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets 614 0.6449 0.4746 0.0011 5.0844 
Political Instability Exposure (SFI) 875 3.215 2.4696 0 16.2614 
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Table 3 
Climate policy exposure (C3I) and loan spreads: Baseline results 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISD and the climate policy 
exposure is measured by the C3I. All variables are as defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the type
of fixed effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) contains only loan characteristics, column (2) 
only firm and macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and (4) include loan, firm and macro controls. For readability,
omitted variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FossilFuel 27.371*** 17.006 14.592 15.741 
(3.351) (1.479) (1.308) (1.250) 
FossilFuel*Climate Policy Exposure (C3I) 0.057 0.219 0.351 0.325 
(0.253) (0.836) (1.195) (1.027) 
Loan Amount -22.626***  -14.153*** -14.224*** 
(-14.739)  (-7.472) (-7.555) 
Maturity 18.574***  0.678 0.266 
(5.440)  (0.109) (0.042) 
Collateral 25.722**  9.551 8.837 
(2.026)  (0.833) (0.778) 
Number of Lenders -1.329***  -0.191 -0.167 
(-3.111)  (-0.607) (-0.541) 
Performance -38.225***  -21.110*** -21.340*** 
(-12.662)  (-6.754) (-6.916) 
Number of Covenants 1.983  5.211*** 5.082*** 
(1.353)  (2.980) (3.029) 
Firm Size  -24.423*** -14.917*** -14.946*** 
 (-18.885) (-9.607) (-9.959) 
Market to Book  -19.754*** -17.167*** -16.996*** 
 (-10.081) (-8.368) (-8.317) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.095*** -0.079** -0.079** 
 (-3.085) (-2.521) (-2.512) 
Leverage  0.893*** 0.879*** 0.882*** 
 (9.319) (9.676) (9.791) 
GDP per Capita  -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (-0.825) (-0.285) (0.658) 
GDP Growth  -4.447 -3.904 -2.997 
 (-1.500) (-1.279) (-0.568) 
Observations 37,249 8,337 8,259 8,252 
R-Squared 0.584 0.591 0.603 0.605 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.565 0.560 0.572 0.571 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
35 
 
Table 4 
Climate policy exposure (CCPI) and loan spreads: Baseline results 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISD and the climate policy 
exposure is measured by the CCPI. All variables are as defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the type
of fixed effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) contains only loan characteristics, column (2) 
only firm and macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and (4) include loan, firm and macro controls. For readability,
omitted variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FossilFuel 34.051*** 27.554** 26.171** 26.543*
(4.482) (2.090) (2.017) (1.872) 
FossilFuel*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 0.053 0.125 0.304 0.277 
(0.206) (0.337) (0.784) (0.679) 
Loan Amount -22.875***  -13.699*** -13.648*** 
(-16.038)  (-8.923) (-9.164) 
Maturity 17.065***  1.493 1.228 
(5.026)  (0.240) (0.195) 
Collateral 19.266  3.756 3.395 
(1.472)  (0.333) (0.303) 
Number of Lenders -1.333***  -0.020 -0.016 
(-3.356)  (-0.063) (-0.053) 
Performance -36.910***  -21.129*** -21.318*** 
(-10.914)  (-7.738) (-7.751) 
Number of Covenants 1.338  4.410*** 4.278*** 
(0.898)  (2.799) (2.837) 
Firm Size  -24.409*** -15.762*** -15.718*** 
 (-20.087) (-12.941) (-13.076) 
Market to Book  -19.886*** -17.407*** -17.449*** 
 (-11.659) (-9.928) (-9.824) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.087*** -0.077** -0.077**
 (-2.884) (-2.544) (-2.532) 
Leverage  0.882*** 0.869*** 0.870*** 
 (10.426) (10.847) (11.083) 
GDP per Capita  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.154) (-0.884) (-1.165) 
GDP Growth  -4.143 -3.843 -4.249 
 (-1.311) (-1.153) (-1.138) 
Observations 45,106 9,739 9,650 9,645 
R-Squared 0.590 0.590 0.601 0.603 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.571 0.558 0.569 0.569 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Table 5 
Climate policy exposure (C3I) and loan spreads: Recent years 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISD and the climate policy exposure is measured by the C3I. All 
variables are as defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) 
and (2) compares pre and post-2011 periods. Column (3) and (4) compares pre and post-2012 periods. Column (5) and (6) compares pre and post-2013 
periods. All specifications contain loan, firm and macro-level controls, while columns (2), (4) and (6) additionally include year, firm’s country, and 
bank’s country effects. For readability, omitted variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FossilFuel 10.352 11.357 9.331 10.540 13.132 13.831 
(0.841) (0.843) (0.862) (0.873) (1.078) (1.020) 
FossilFuel*Climate Policy Exposure (C3I) 0.153 0.140 0.207 0.191 0.228 0.212 
(0.622) (0.536) (0.841) (0.728) (0.794) (0.693) 
FossilFuel*Post2011 13.337 13.987     
(0.575) (0.598)     
FossilFuel*Post2011*Climate Policy Exposure (C3I) 0.387 0.355     
(0.950) (0.873)     
FossilFuel*Post2012   24.602 24.765   
  (0.859) (0.833)   
FossilFuel*Post2012*Climate Policy Exposure (C3I)   0.343 0.306   
  (0.688) (0.603)   
FossilFuel*Post2013     14.109 18.961 
    (0.704) (0.870) 
FossilFuel*Post2013*Climate Policy Exposure (C3I)     0.719 0.621 
    (1.452) (1.217) 
Loan Amount -14.128*** -14.208*** -14.144*** -14.226*** -14.122*** -14.202*** 
(-7.406) (-7.487) (-7.406) (-7.493) (-7.436) (-7.515) 
Maturity 0.664 0.265 0.730 0.332 0.634 0.227 
(0.106) (0.042) (0.116) (0.052) (0.101) (0.036) 
Collateral 18.790* 17.752 17.751 16.671 14.998 14.244 
(1.708) (1.640) (1.483) (1.408) (1.282) (1.237) 
Number of Lenders -0.186 -0.162 -0.200 -0.176 -0.197 -0.172 
(-0.591) (-0.526) (-0.632) (-0.567) (-0.627) (-0.560) 
Performance -20.917*** -21.153*** -21.063*** -21.299*** -21.158*** -21.387*** 
(-6.765) (-6.921) (-6.763) (-6.931) (-6.655) (-6.818) 
Number of Covenants 5.136*** 5.014*** 5.144*** 5.026*** 5.122*** 5.001*** 
(2.918) (2.962) (2.952) (2.996) (2.929) (2.970) 
Firm Size -14.954*** -14.966*** -14.900*** -14.911*** -14.937*** -14.963*** 
(-9.561) (-9.856) (-9.500) (-9.804) (-9.529) (-9.861) 
Market to Book -17.149*** -16.974*** -17.093*** -16.917*** -17.092*** -16.927***
(-8.302) (-8.251) (-8.296) (-8.260) (-8.342) (-8.295) 
Asset Tangibility -0.080** -0.079** -0.077** -0.076** -0.079** -0.078**
(-2.553) (-2.537) (-2.463) (-2.450) (-2.565) (-2.552) 
Leverage 0.873*** 0.876*** 0.872*** 0.876*** 0.876*** 0.879*** 
(9.537) (9.673) (9.522) (9.646) (9.605) (9.717) 
GDP per Capita -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
(-0.300) (0.603) (-0.293) (0.607) (-0.291) (0.633) 
GDP Growth -3.987 -2.757 -4.067 -2.814 -3.947 -3.166 
(-1.306) (-0.519) (-1.359) (-0.537) (-1.290) (-0.597) 
Observations 8,259 8,252 8,259 8,252 8,259 8,252 
R-Squared 0.603 0.605 0.604 0.605 0.603 0.605 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.572 0.571 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.572 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Firm’s Country, and Bank’s Country Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Table 6 
Climate policy exposure (CCPI) and loan spreads: Recent years 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISD and the climate policy exposure is measured by the CCPI. All
variables are as defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) and
(2) compares pre and post-2011 periods. Column (3) and (4) compares pre and post-2013 periods. Column (5) and (6) compares pre and post-2015
periods. All specifications contain loan, firm and macro-level controls, while columns (2), (4) and (6) additionally include year, firm’s country, and bank’s
country effects. For readability, omitted variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FossilFuel 15.700 16.022 15.867 16.093 26.839** 27.206*
(1.344) (1.205) (1.293) (1.147) (2.031) (1.860) 
FossilFuel*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) -0.009 -0.020 0.166 0.137 0.181 0.150 
(-0.028) (-0.060) (0.465) (0.355) (0.451) (0.352) 
FossilFuel*Post2011 31.870 32.455     
(1.310) (1.325)     
FossilFuel*Post2011*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 0.257 0.222     
(0.475) (0.406)     
FossilFuel*Post2013   55.194 56.455   
  (1.389) (1.404)   
FossilFuel*Post2013*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI)   0.030 0.022   
  (0.035) (0.026)   
FossilFuel*Post2015     5.214 7.253 
    (0.170) (0.233) 
FossilFuel*Post2015*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI)     1.917* 1.958* 
    (1.831) (1.917) 
Loan Amount -13.619*** -13.581*** -13.636*** -13.599*** -13.691*** -13.641*** 
(-8.778) (-9.007) (-8.862) (-9.105) (-8.881) (-9.120) 
Maturity 1.419 1.162 1.522 1.259 1.647 1.397 
(0.227) (0.184) (0.242) (0.198) (0.265) (0.223) 
Collateral 19.091* 18.348* 15.672 15.515 7.645 7.435 
(1.782) (1.728) (1.389) (1.389) (0.699) (0.688) 
Number of Lenders -0.009 -0.006 -0.019 -0.015 -0.016 -0.013 
(-0.029) (-0.019) (-0.062) (-0.049) (-0.051) (-0.041) 
Performance -20.957*** -21.143*** -21.177*** -21.359*** -21.240*** -21.431*** 
(-7.799) (-7.801) (-7.720) (-7.730) (-7.854) (-7.865) 
Number of Covenants 4.314*** 4.192*** 4.327*** 4.210*** 4.395*** 4.259***
(2.722) (2.763) (2.739) (2.781) (2.804) (2.840) 
Firm Size -15.842*** -15.781*** -15.833*** -15.778*** -15.750*** -15.702*** 
(-12.931) (-13.031) (-12.916) (-13.037) (-12.993) (-13.127) 
Market to Book -17.318*** -17.360*** -17.218*** -17.252*** -17.368*** -17.412*** 
(-9.850) (-9.726) (-9.821) (-9.714) (-9.887) (-9.797) 
Asset Tangibility -0.076** -0.076** -0.074** -0.074** -0.076** -0.076**
(-2.502) (-2.489) (-2.482) (-2.471) (-2.493) (-2.483) 
Leverage 0.861*** 0.862*** 0.863*** 0.864*** 0.866*** 0.867*** 
(10.716) (10.972) (10.795) (11.032) (10.922) (11.180) 
GDP per Capita -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.908) (-1.179) (-0.892) (-1.145) (-0.875) (-1.152) 
GDP Growth -3.780 -4.123 -3.820 -4.150 -3.770 -4.235 
(-1.133) (-1.101) (-1.134) (-1.092) (-1.143) (-1.140) 
Observations 9,650 9,645 9,650 9,645 9,650 9,645 
R-Squared 0.601 0.604 0.602 0.604 0.601 0.604 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.570 0.570 0.570 0.571 0.570 0.570 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year, Firm’s Country, and Bank’s Country Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Table 7 
Climate policy exposure (CCPI) and AISU 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISU and the climate policy 
exposure is measured by the CCPI. All variables are as defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the 
type of fixed effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) contains only loan characteristics, column 
(2) only firm and macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and (4) include loan, firm and macro controls. For 
readability, omitted variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FossilFuel 6.489*** 4.448* 4.218* 4.902** 
(3.353) (1.899) (1.789) (2.140) 
FossilFuel*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 0.063 0.046 0.076 0.061 
(1.167) (0.729) (1.239) (1.033) 
Loan Amount -3.678***  -1.739*** -1.702*** 
(-9.146)  (-6.268) (-6.181) 
Maturity -0.878  -1.957 -2.121 
(-1.329)  (-1.017) (-1.118) 
Collateral 0.323  -0.553 -0.835 
(0.164)  (-0.249) (-0.365) 
Number of Lenders 0.031  0.082 0.080 
(0.497)  (1.513) (1.473) 
Performance -3.778***  -1.089* -0.969* 
(-8.118)  (-1.936) (-1.693) 
Number of Covenants 0.831***  0.890*** 0.853*** 
(3.022)  (3.117) (2.913) 
Firm Size  -3.515*** -2.597*** -2.613*** 
 (-13.396) (-5.931) (-6.019) 
Market to Book  -3.043*** -2.792*** -2.831*** 
 (-8.366) (-8.294) (-8.557) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 
 (-1.195) (-0.751) (-0.815) 
Leverage  0.166*** 0.163*** 0.163*** 
 (10.768) (10.536) (10.319) 
GDP per Capita  -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.840) (-1.372) (-1.262) 
GDP Growth  0.035 0.066 -0.812 
 (0.067) (0.127) (-1.341) 
Observations 14,650 5,610 5,587 5,582 
R-Squared 0.473 0.521 0.529 0.532 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.441 0.477 0.485 0.485 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Table 8 
Climate policy exposure (CCPI) and proved reserves over total assets 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISD and the climate policy 
exposure is measured by the CCPI. All variables are as defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the type of 
fixed effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) contains only loan characteristics, column (2) only firm 
and macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and (4) include loan, firm and macro controls. For readability, omitted 
variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets -7.580 -30.382 -48.994 -44.145 
 (-0.178) (-0.759) (-1.471) (-1.202) 
Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI)  0.701* 0.700* 0.706* 0.713*
 (1.945) (1.898) (1.894) (1.846) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets *Climate Policy 
Exposure (CCPI) 
0.087 0.572 1.046 0.914 
(0.067) (0.471) (1.009) (0.794) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Post2015 -933.287*** -800.644*** -726.637*** -759.065***
 (-3.841) (-10.293) (-8.284) (-14.588) 
Post2015*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) -1.886*** -2.445*** -2.333*** -2.343***
 (-3.430) (-3.350) (-3.786) (-3.873) 
Proved Reserves over Total 
Assets*Post2015*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 
27.876*** 26.863*** 25.501*** 26.364***
(4.138) (9.871) (9.412) (15.110) 
Loan Amount -22.794***  -13.216*** -13.201***
 (-16.317)  (-8.692) (-8.918) 
Maturity 17.043***  0.154 -0.235 
 (5.001)  (0.024) (-0.037) 
Collateral 31.654**  20.201* 18.960* 
 (2.251)  (1.797) (1.680) 
Number of Lenders -1.311***  -0.013 -0.004 
 (-3.229)  (-0.044) (-0.013) 
Performance -36.157***  -20.570*** -20.643***
 (-10.881)  (-8.062) (-8.111) 
Number of Covenants 1.153  4.044*** 3.898*** 
 (0.774)  (2.797) (2.751) 
Firm Size  -24.675*** -16.320*** -16.340***
  (-19.654) (-12.906) (-12.964) 
Market to Book  -19.584*** -17.162*** -17.192***
  (-10.740) (-9.085) (-9.048) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.087*** -0.079** -0.078**
  (-2.722) (-2.424) (-2.368) 
Leverage  0.898*** 0.881*** 0.886***
  (10.276) (10.730) (10.942) 
GDP per Capita  -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
  (-0.859) (-0.563) (-1.094) 
GDP Growth  -4.446 -4.052 -4.269 
  (-1.274) (-1.126) (-1.195) 
Observations 44,362 9,492 9,407 9,402 
R-Squared 0.589 0.592 0.603 0.605 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.569 0.560 0.571 0.571 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Table 9 
Climate policy exposure (CCPI) and proved reserves over total assets - Only oil and gas firms 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISD and the climate policy exposure 
is measured by the CCPI. All variables are as defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed 
effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) contains only loan characteristics, column (2) only firm and 
macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and (4) include loan, firm and macro controls. For readability, omitted variables due 
to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets -7.801 -36.341 -49.890 -45.082 
 (-0.183) (-0.902) (-1.480) (-1.213) 
Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI)  0.651* 0.574 0.620* 0.627 
 (1.794) (1.631) (1.693) (1.649) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets *Climate Policy 
Exposure (CCPI) 
0.161 0.852 1.195 1.065 
(0.123) (0.699) (1.123) (0.904) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Post2015 -932.856*** -793.983*** -724.917*** -757.404*** 
 (-3.839) (-10.216) (-8.298) (-14.575) 
Post2015*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) -1.836*** -2.320*** -2.249*** -2.258*** 
 (-3.320) (-3.208) (-3.671) (-3.756) 
Proved Reserves over Total 
Assets*Post2015*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 
27.798*** 26.568*** 25.336*** 26.199*** 
(4.126) (9.786) (9.392) (15.067) 
Loan Amount -22.799***  -13.217*** -13.203*** 
 (-16.306)  (-8.690) (-8.916) 
Maturity 17.044***  0.169 -0.220 
 (5.003)  (0.027) (-0.035) 
Collateral 30.305**  16.616 15.358 
 (2.112)  (1.531) (1.409) 
Number of Lenders -1.314***  -0.015 -0.006 
 (-3.233)  (-0.050) (-0.019) 
Performance -36.133***  -20.459*** -20.529*** 
 (-10.879)  (-8.020) (-8.062) 
Number of Covenants 1.160  4.088*** 3.942*** 
 (0.779)  (2.832) (2.788) 
Firm Size  -24.734*** -16.374*** -16.395*** 
  (-19.656) (-12.916) (-12.937) 
Market to Book  -19.620*** -17.202*** -17.232*** 
  (-10.754) (-9.112) (-9.075) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.087*** -0.079** -0.078** 
  (-2.705) (-2.217) (-2.186) 
Leverage  0.897*** 0.881*** 0.886*** 
  (10.279) (10.744) (10.955) 
GDP per Capita  -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
  (-0.859) (-0.563) (-1.221) 
GDP Growth  -4.453 -4.058 -4.268 
  (-1.274) (-1.126) (-1.194) 
Observations 44,358 9,488 9,403 9,398 
R-Squared 0.589 0.593 0.603 0.606 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.569 0.560 0.571 0.571 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
 
 
41 
 
Table 10 
Climate policy exposure (CCPI) and loan maturity  
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses from the estimation of a linear probability model. Dependent 
variable is the binary response variable Short Maturity, which equals one if loan maturity ≤ four years and zero otherwise. 
The climate policy exposure is measured by the CCPI. All variables are defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table 
denotes the type of fixed effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) contains only loan characteristics, 
column (2) only firm and macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and (4) include loan, firm and macro controls. For 
readability, omitted variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets 0.461 0.472* 0.366 0.333 
 (1.502) (1.760) (1.232) (1.099) 
Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI)  0.002 0.004*** 0.004** 0.004**
 (1.072) (2.653) (2.365) (2.369) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Climate Policy 
Exposure (CCPI) 
-0.012 -0.013* -0.010 -0.009 
(-1.463) (-1.734) (-1.226) (-1.090) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Post2015 0.601 -0.146 0.191 0.129 
 (0.616) (-0.225) (0.334) (0.257) 
Post2015*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 (0.464) (0.547) (0.643) (0.661) 
Proved Reserves over Total 
Assets*Post2015*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 
-0.002 0.013 0.005 0.006 
(-0.081) (0.541) (0.231) (0.350) 
Loan Amount -0.013**  -0.053*** -0.054***
 (-2.472)  (-7.624) (-7.558) 
AISD -0.000***  0.000** 0.000**
 (-2.956)  (2.063) (1.983) 
Collateral 0.167***  0.120** 0.124** 
 (3.862)  (2.455) (2.464) 
Number of Lenders -0.006***  -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-5.250)  (-5.572) (-5.498) 
Performance -0.042***  -0.015 -0.015 
 (-4.955)  (-1.531) (-1.487) 
Number of Covenants -0.007*  -0.004 -0.003 
 (-1.664)  (-0.738) (-0.553) 
Firm Size  -0.009 0.043*** 0.044***
  (-1.408) (6.476) (6.541) 
Market to Book  -0.015** 0.004 0.005 
  (-2.000) (0.579) (0.610) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*
  (-3.482) (-1.721) (-1.816) 
Leverage  0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (1.308) (1.113) (1.115) 
GDP per Capita  -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (-1.197) (0.555) (1.581) 
GDP Growth  0.007 0.006 -0.007 
  (0.750) (0.532) (-0.614) 
Observations 45164 13287 9492 9487 
R-Squared 0.344 0.409 0.425 0.427 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.314 0.365 0.379 0.378 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Table 11 
Climate policy exposure (CCPI) and loan amount 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is Loan Amount and the climate 
policy exposure is measured by the CCPI. All variables are as defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes
the type of fixed effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) contains only loan characteristics, 
column (2) only firm and macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and (4) include loan, firm and macro controls. For
readability, omitted variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FossilFuel 0.199*** -0.108 0.075 0.084 
(4.118) (-1.086) (0.811) (0.976) 
FossilFuel*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(6.774) (6.066) (3.630) (3.551) 
AISD -0.002***  -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(-11.385)  (-7.132) (-7.102) 
Maturity 0.189***  0.341*** 0.348***
(6.864)  (7.379) (7.261) 
Collateral 0.140  0.321*** 0.319***
(1.566)  (3.398) (3.434) 
Number of Lenders 0.101***  0.037*** 0.036***
(12.102)  (5.990) (5.935) 
Performance 0.205***  0.063** 0.058* 
(4.581)  (2.058) (1.911) 
Number of Covenants 0.000  -0.018* -0.017 
(0.017)  (-1.666) (-1.573) 
Firm Size  0.505*** 0.431*** 0.438*** 
 (26.628) (29.455) (29.385) 
Market to Book  0.146*** 0.092*** 0.096*** 
 (7.655) (6.754) (7.556) 
Asset Tangibility  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.680) (1.024) (0.899) 
Leverage  -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.172) (0.809) (0.931) 
GDP per Capita  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 
 (5.843) (3.884) (1.661) 
GDP Growth  0.081** 0.023 0.015 
 (2.423) (1.143) (0.930) 
Observations 45,106 13,644 9,650 9,645 
R-Squared 0.534 0.624 0.656 0.660 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.512 0.596 0.629 0.631 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Table 12 
The role of banks’ “greenness” 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISD and the climate policy 
exposure is measured by the CCPI. The “greenness” of banks is measured with a dummy defined by banks’
membership (or not) in the United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative. All variables are as defined
in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects and clustering used in each specification.
Column (1) contains only loan characteristics, column (2) only firm and macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and 
(4) include loan, firm and macro controls. For readability, omitted variables due to collinearity are left out. (*
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FossilFuel 42.164*** 39.581*** 38.335*** 38.767***
(4.551) (2.816) (2.742) (2.745) 
FossilFuel*Climate Policy Exposure 
(CCPI)*Participation Green Principles (UNEP FI) 
1.543*** 2.192* 2.143* 2.230 
(2.692) (1.797) (1.759) (1.595) 
FossilFuel*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) -0.324 -0.399 -0.207 -0.233 
 (-1.493) (-1.221) (-0.630) (-0.683) 
FossilFuel*Participation Green Principles (UNEP FI) -36.069** -44.689 -44.383 -48.932 
 (-2.157) (-1.270) (-1.288) (-1.127) 
Loan Amount -22.861***  -13.649*** -13.617*** 
(-16.093)  (-8.914) (-9.206) 
Maturity 17.084***  1.806 1.502 
(5.027)  (0.291) (0.240) 
Collateral 18.877  2.683 2.414 
(1.485)  (0.235) (0.213) 
Number of Lenders -1.328***  -0.017 -0.010 
(-3.354)  (-0.053) (-0.033) 
Performance -36.830***  -21.188*** -21.374*** 
(-10.923)  (-7.761) (-7.780) 
Number of Covenants 1.311  4.399*** 4.270*** 
(0.883)  (2.787) (2.834) 
Firm Size  -24.274*** -15.663*** -15.635*** 
 (-20.378) (-12.678) (-12.866) 
Market to Book  -19.823*** -17.354*** -17.377*** 
 (-11.646) (-9.904) (-9.803) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.089*** -0.079** -0.078** 
 (-2.939) (-2.598) (-2.582) 
Leverage  0.885*** 0.872*** 0.874*** 
 (10.319) (10.752) (11.033) 
GDP per Capita  -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.168) (-0.897) (-1.336) 
GDP Growth  -4.298 -3.994 -4.061 
 (-1.334) (-1.177) (-1.120) 
Observations 45,106 9,739 9,650 9,645 
R-Squared 0.590 0.591 0.602 0.604 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.571 0.559 0.570 0.571 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Figure 1 
Weighted exposure to climate policy and AISD 
  
   
The figure illustrates the relation of the firms’ total cost of the loan facilities (AISD) and the 
climate policy exposure of fossil fuel firms, Climate policy exposure, for different time 
periods. The left column contains the Climate policy exposure measured by the C3I; the right 
column contains the exposure measured by the CCPI. The blue dots indicate average exposure 
above the annual mean exposure, the red dots represent below mean average exposure. 
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Figure 2 
Weighted exposure to climate policy and the all-in-spread undrawn 
 
  
The figure illustrates the relation of the firms’ total costs for each dollar available under a 
commitment (AISU) and the climate policy exposure of fossil fuel firms, Climate policy 
exposure, measured by the C3I (left hand side) and the CCPI (right hand side). The blue dots 
indicate average exposure above the annual mean exposure, the red dots represent below mean 
average exposure. 
  
Appendix 
This Appendix includes additional summary statistics and figures illustrating the climate policy 
indices. Further, it provides additional sensitivity tests for the findings reported in the main text. 
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Table A.1 
Summary statistics –relative fossil fuel reserves by country 
Summary statistics of firm’s relative oil, gas and/or coal reserves in the period 2007-2016 by country. In our sample firms own 
oil, gas, and coal reserves in 59 countries. 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Number of countries in which firms own oil, gas 
and/or coal reserves 
1,445 1.39 1.02 1 13 
Country:      
Algeria 6 0.28 0.42 0.01 0.82 
Angola 5 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Argentina 17 0.23 0.37 0.03 1.00 
Australia 77 0.49 0.43 0.00 1 
Azerbaijan 3 0.04 0 0.04 0.04 
Bangladesh 6 0.17 0.02 0.15 0.22 
Brazil 2 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.13 
Bulgaria 5 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.14 
Canada 500 0.82 0.29 0.02 1 
China 16 0.31 0.43 0.00 1 
Colombia 46 0.66 0.37 0.00 1 
Congo, Rep. 1 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 
Côte d'Ivoire 2 0.06 0 0.06 0.06 
Croatia 5 0.85 0.01 0.85 0.86 
Czech Republic 2 0.53 0.03 0.51 0.55 
Denmark 1 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 
Ecuador 2 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.09 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 32 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.76 
Equatorial Guinea 3 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.11 
France 15 0.30 0.04 0.25 0.38 
Gabon 11 0.63 0.43 0.01 1 
Germany 2 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.04 
India 38 0.88 0.19 0.54 1 
Indonesia 52 0.63 0.40 0.02 1 
Iraq 1 0.06 . 0.06 0.06 
Ireland 13 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.17 
Israel 8 0.74 0.36 0.27 1 
Italy 7 0.16 0.18 0.02 0.39 
Kazakhstan 5 0.42 0.53 0.03 1 
Libya 4 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Malaysia 12 0.14 0.17 0.02 0.55 
Mauritania 7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mexico 20 1 0 1 1 
Mongolia 5 1 0 1 1 
Morocco 2 0.30 0 0.30 0.30 
Myanmar 3 0.06 0 0.06 0.06 
Netherlands 18 0.10 0.15 0.01 0.70 
New Zealand 13 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.26 
Nigeria 5 0.79 0.19 0.62 1 
A.3 
 
Norway 43 0.43 0.41 0.00 1 
Oman 1 1 . 1 1 
Pakistan 7 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.12 
Papua New Guinea 7 0.65 0.45 0.00 1 
Peru 9 0.37 0.47 0.01 1 
Poland 4 0.70 0.26 0.45 0.94 
Romania 3 0.97 0.00 0.96 0.97 
Russian Federation 41 0.97 0.10 0.64 1 
South Africa 2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Sudan 4 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.16 
Syrian Arab Republic 9 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.14 
Thailand 6 0.63 0.21 0.44 1 
Trinidad and Tobago 9 0.30 0.26 0.03 0.96 
Tunisia 7 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.37 
Turkey 3 0.35 0.56 0.03 1.00 
United Kingdom 65 0.39 0.37 0.00 1 
United States 793 0.88 0.26 0.00 1 
Venezuela, RB 4 0.76 0.48 0.04 1 
Vietnam 16 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.14 
Yemen, Rep. 2 0.62 0.53 0.24 1 
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Table A.2 
Country of headquarters of fossil fuel firms
The table reports the frequency of headquarters of fossil 
fuel firms which own oil, gas, and/or coal reserves in the 
period 2007-2016. 
Country Frequency Percent
Argentina 3 0.36
Australia 21 2.49
Bermuda 10 1.19
Canada 79 9.37
China 1 0.12
Gabon 3 0.36
India 11 1.3
Indonesia 15 1.78
Israel 4 0.47
Mexico 15 1.78
Mongolia 2 0.24
Nigeria 1 0.12
Norway 7 0.83
Papua New Guinea 1 0.12
Romania 3 0.36
Russia 25 2.97
Singapore 4 0.47
Sweden 1 0.12
USA 619 73.43
United Kingdom 14 1.66
Venezuela 3 0.36
Yemen 1 0.12
Total 843 100
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Table A.3a 
Fossil fuel firms that own oil, gas, and/or coal reserves (disclosed by country) 
Abraxas Petroleum Co Diamondback Energy Inc Mainland Resources Inc Ram Energy Inc 
Addax Petroleum Corp Doral Energy Corp Mariner Energy Rancher Energy Corp 
Alliance Resource Partners LP Double Eagle Petroleum Co Massey Energy Co Range Resources Corp 
Alpha Natural Resources LLC Dune Energy Inc Max Petroleum Plc Reliance Industries Ltd 
Anderson Energy Ltd EOG Resources Inc Merit Energy ReoStar Energy Corp 
Antares Energy Ltd EPL Oil & Gas Inc  Midstates Petroleum Co LLC Resaca Exploitation Inc 
Antero Resources Corp EV Energy Partners LP Mongolian Mining Corp Resolute Energy Corp 
Apache Corp EV Properties LP Murphy Oil Corp Rex Energy Corp 
Approach Resources Inc Eagle Exploration Operating LLC National Fuel Gas Co Rice Energy Inc 
Arc Resources Eagle Rock Energy Partners LP Natural Resource Partners LP Rosetta Resources Inc 
Arch Coal Inc Earthstone Energy Inc New Source Energy Partners LP Rosneft Oil Co OJSC 
Arena Resources Inc Edge Petroleum Corp Newfield Exploration Co RusPetro Plc 
Atlas Resource Partners LP Emerald Oil Inc Niko Resources Ltd SM Energy Co 
Aurora Oil & Gas Corp Encana North American Coal SNP Petrom SA 
Avner Oil Exploration Ltd Encore Acquisition Co Northern Oil & Gas Inc Salamander Energy Plc 
BPZ Resources Inc Encore Energy Partners LP Norwegian Energy Co ASA Sanchez Energy Corp 
Baseline Oil & Gas Corp Endeavour International Corp Novatek OAO SandRidge Energy Inc 
Beach Energy Ltd Energy XXI Ltd. OMV PETROM SA Saratoga Resources Inc 
Belden & Blake Corp Enerplus Corp OPTI Canada Inc Shoreline Energy LLC 
Berry Petroleum Co Exco Resources Inc Oasis Petroleum North America LLC Southern Pacific ResourceCorp 
Bill Barrett Corp Exillon Energy Plc Oil India Ltd Southwestern Energy Co 
BlackPearl Resources Inc Exploration Company of Delaware Oil Search Ltd St Mary Land & Exploration Co 
Bois D'Arc Energy LLC FX Energy Inc Origin Energy Ltd Stone Energy Corp 
Bonterra Energy Ltd Fairborne Energy Ltd PT Bayan Resources Storm Cat Energy Corp 
Breitburn Energy Partners Foresight Energy PT Berau Coal Energy Straits Asia Resources Ltd 
Brigham Exploration Co Forest Oil Corp PT Bumi Resources Tbk Stratic Energy Corp 
Cabot Oil & Gas Corp GMX Resources Inc PT Harum Energy SunCoke Energy 
California Resources Corp GasCo Energy Inc Pacific Rubiales Energy Corp Suncor Energy Inc 
Callon Petroleum Co Gastar Exploration USA Inc Parallel Petroleum Corp Suncor Energy Ventures Holding
Cano Petroleum Inc Gazpromneft OAO Patriot Coal Corp Superior Energy Services Inc 
Carrizo Oil & Gas Inc GeoResources Inc Peabody Energy Corp Swift Energy Co 
Cenovus Energy Inc Geomet Inc Pengrowth Energy Corp TXCO Resources Inc 
Chaparral Energy Inc Goodrich Petroleum Co Penn Virginia Corp Talisman Energy Inc 
Chesapeake Energy Gran Tierra Energy Inc Penn Virginia Resource Partners LP Terra Energy Corp 
Chinook Energy Inc Gulfport Energy Corp. PetroLatina Energy Plc Tethys Oil AB 
Cimarex Energy Co Halcon Resources LLC PetroQuest Energy Inc Teton Energy Corp 
Clayton Williams Energy Inc Hidili Industry International Develop.. PetroQuest Energy LLC Texas American Resources 
Cloud Peak Energy Resources HighMount Exploration & Production Petroceltic International Plc. Total Gabon SA 
Compton Petroleum Corp Highpine Oil & Gas Ltd Petrohawk Energy Corp Triangle USA Petroleum Corp. 
Comstock Resources Inc Husky Energy Inc Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) Unit Corp 
Concho Resources Inc InterOil Corp Petroleos de Venezuela SA Vaalco Energy 
Connacher Oil & Gas International Coal Group Petroleum Development Corp anguard Natural Resources LLC 
Consol Energy Inc Isramco Petsec Energy Inc Venoco Inc 
Constellation Energy Partners Iteration Energy Pinnacle Gas Resources Inc Viper Energy Partners LP 
Contango Oil & Gas Co Ithaca Energy (UK) Ltd Pioneer Natural Resources Co Voyager Oil & Gas Inc 
Continental Resources James River Coal Co Pioneer Southwest Energy Partners LP W&T Offshore 
Crew Energy Inc Kodiak Oil & Gas Corp Plains Exploration & Production Co LP WPX Energy 
Crimson Exploration Inc Laredo Petroleum Premier Oil Plc Walter Energy Inc 
Cubic Energy Inc Legacy Reserves LP PrimeEnergy Corp Warren Resources Inc 
Delek Group Ltd Linn Energy LLC QEP Resources Inc Westmoreland Coal Co 
Delta Petroleum Lone Pine Resources Inc QR Energy Whitehaven Coal Ltd 
Denbury Resources Inc Lucas Energy Inc Quest Resource Corp Whiting Petroleum Corp 
Det Norske Oljeselskap ASA MEG Energy Corp Questar Market Resources Inc XTO Energy Inc 
Devon Energy Corp Magnum Hunter Resources Corp Quicksilver Resources Inc YPF SA 
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Table A.3b 
Fossil fuel firms that own oil, gas, and/or coal reserves 
not disclosed by country 
Addax Petroleum Corp Marathon Oil Corp 
Anadarko Petroleum Corp Max Petroleum Plc 
Arc Resources Nexen Inc 
BG Group Plc Noble Energy Inc 
Baseline Oil & Gas Corp OPTI Canada Inc 
Beach Energy Ltd Occidental Petroleum 
CNOOC Ltd Oil Search Ltd 
Canadian Natural Resources Pengrowth Energy Corp 
Chinook Energy Inc Rancher Energy Corp 
Cloud Peak Energy Resources LLC Reliance Industries Ltd 
ConocoPhillips Royal Dutch Shell Plc  
Cubic Energy Inc Saratoga Resources Inc 
Delek Group Ltd Stratic Energy Corp 
Devon Energy Corp Superior Energy Services Inc 
EOG Resources Inc Tethys Oil AB 
EV Energy Partners LP Teton Energy Corp 
Exxon Mobil Corp Vaalco Energy 
INA-Industrija Nafte dd Whitehaven Coal Ltd 
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Table A.4 
Summary statistics – Climate Change Cooperation Index (C3I) by country 
Summary statistics for countries in which the samples’ firms have oil, gas and/or coal reserves for 
the period 2007-2014. 
Country Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Algeria 19 53.29 3.81 42.15 60.47 
Angola 15 51.25 4.34 39.55 59.92 
Argentina 19 53.74 1.94 49.11 56.09 
Australia 19 54.51 0.75 52.53 55.55 
Azerbaijan 19 55.29 6.78 44.22 70.01 
Bangladesh 19 52.00 1.28 50.16 54.88 
Bolivia 19 53.45 3.77 46.98 62.94 
Brazil 19 53.93 1.43 51.91 55.95 
Bulgaria 19 55.08 3.65 46.35 62.75 
Canada 19 54.68 0.81 52.65 55.62 
Côte d'Ivoire 19 52.53 1.72 49.28 55.44 
China 19 51.49 3.46 44.64 55.63 
Colombia 19 54.89 1.40 52.31 58.25 
Congo, Rep. 18 52.56 5.03 47.55 71.69 
Croatia 19 51.66 2.28 46.20 54.52 
Czech Republic 19 55.01 1.67 49.81 58.56 
Denmark 19 55.65 1.41 52.49 57.36 
Vietnam 19 51.15 2.78 44.55 56.23 
Ecuador 19 53.86 2.02 49.41 58.00 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 19 51.82 2.54 46.35 56.46 
Equatorial Guinea 14 43.86 14.08 2.52 53.66 
France 19 55.76 0.81 53.38 56.94 
Gabon 16 51.27 1.43 49.81 54.94 
Ghana 19 52.79 2.13 48.74 55.47 
Germany 19 55.25 0.80 52.19 55.98 
India 19 51.57 1.84 49.37 56.41 
Indonesia 19 52.91 5.20 47.43 71.96 
Ireland 19 55.13 1.26 52.06 56.58 
Iraq 5 48.11 2.00 44.71 49.95 
Israel 19 53.10 1.26 50.43 54.92 
Italy 19 54.08 2.01 50.08 56.32 
Japan 19 55.00 1.29 50.44 56.08 
Kazakhstan 19 53.11 9.99 35.87 81.23 
Libya 13 48.66 4.57 46.10 63.58 
Mauritania 19 51.82 0.82 50.02 53.73 
Malaysia 19 53.90 2.65 47.39 59.33 
Mexico 19 54.32 1.60 51.64 55.91 
Moldova 19 56.99 13.85 46.00 100.00 
Mongolia 19 53.15 13.05 29.05 93.06 
Morocco 19 53.19 1.47 49.95 54.86 
Myanmar 15 52.48 3.69 45.48 61.25 
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New Zealand 19 55.19 0.60 53.84 55.95 
Nigeria 19 51.95 4.55 35.19 57.78 
Norway 19 55.90 1.11 52.67 57.90 
Netherlands 19 55.38 0.38 54.64 55.92 
Oman 19 52.99 3.76 45.87 59.54 
Pakistan 19 51.82 1.59 49.15 56.26 
Peru 19 53.35 1.80 50.32 56.52 
Papua New Guinea 19 52.53 2.80 45.79 57.47 
Poland 19 54.88 1.33 52.54 57.95 
Romania 19 54.80 3.29 48.21 61.38 
Russian Federation 19 53.72 1.96 49.52 57.20 
South Africa 18 52.87 2.78 46.61 57.51 
Sudan 16 52.02 1.57 49.80 55.01 
Syrian Arab Republic 12 50.36 8.43 34.76 63.46 
Tanzania 19 51.44 1.28 48.46 55.16 
Thailand 19 53.64 1.28 51.80 56.98 
Turkmenistan 19 49.73 17.24 0.00 95.83 
Trinidad and Tobago 19 51.49 5.70 40.35 65.18 
Tunisia 19 53.50 1.54 50.47 55.82 
Turkey 11 50.57 1.89 47.22 52.86 
United Kingdom 19 55.46 0.54 54.02 56.30 
United States 19 54.30 0.77 52.27 55.21 
Venezuela, RB 18 52.58 4.18 43.45 61.69 
Yemen, Rep. 19 50.25 3.10 42.00 55.50 
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Table A.5 
Summary statistics – Climate change policy index (CCPI) by country 
Summary statistics for countries in which the samples’ firms have oil, gas and/or coal reserves for 
the period 2007-2016. 
Country Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Algeria 10 53.55 3.797569 46.8 59.36 
Argentina 10 51.456 5.003395 45.56 59.4 
Australia 10 39.354 3.392732 33.82 44.89 
Brazil 10 59.329 4.530451 52.51 65.06 
Bulgaria 10 51.997 4.807568 45.7 58.89 
Canada 10 37.2 2.104323 32.72 39.96 
China 10 48.41 3.766837 44.36 55.09 
Croatia 10 52.406 3.964233 46.26 57.84 
Czech Republic 10 52.585 3.281705 48.02 58.31 
Denmark 10 64.03 7.791782 51.33 76.62 
Egypt 10 56.401 2.571081 52.8 60.03 
France 10 60.192 3.349971 54.65 65.97 
Germany 10 60.326 3.431761 57.38 68.23 
India 10 59.458 3.968601 53.56 64.96 
Indonesia 10 57.144 2.324316 54.65 60.94 
Ireland 10 56.977 4.786939 48.85 63.08 
Italy 10 52.916 5.545405 43.99 59.84 
Japan 10 46.407 3.512359 37.33 49.47 
Kazakhstan 10 40.355 8.701166 32.28 55.28 
Malaysia 10 46.988 2.801638 43.73 52.58 
Mexico 10 58.988 1.989309 55.96 63.71 
Morocco 10 59.801 2.641012 56.56 64.1 
Netherlands 10 52.371 3.594874 44.45 56.33 
New Zealand 10 51.976 2.523503 47.39 56.19 
Norway 10 57.278 3.655424 50.4 62.41 
Poland 10 50.67 3.807793 45.74 56.14 
Romania 10 57.61 3.773157 51.14 62.67 
Russian Federation 10 47.796 3.454376 42.59 53.36 
South Africa 10 49.471 2.012513 46.1 52.96 
Thailand 10 54.366 2.801497 49.41 59.02 
Turkey 10 48.343 6.445522 39.83 60.99 
United Kingdom 10 63.98 4.487766 59.17 70.81 
United States 10 43.578 7.452962 31.3 55.48 
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Table A.6 
Controlling for political instability exposure (SFI) 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISD and the political instability exposure is measured by the 
State Fragility Index (SFI). All variables are as defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects and clustering used in 
each specification. Column (1) contains only loan characteristics, column (2) only firm and macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and (4) include 
loan, firm and macro controls. For readability, omitted variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets -4.038 -30.384 -48.041 -44.451 
 (-0.086) (-0.757) (-1.403) (-1.276) 
Political Instability Exposure (SFI) 9.206 -0.190 2.303 -1.753 
 (0.618) (-0.011) (0.140) (-0.095) 
Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 0.205 0.711 0.579 0.806 
 (0.222) (0.743) (0.627) (0.759) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Post2015*Political Instability 
Exposure (SFI) 
-85.479 -93.896 -85.800 -89.691 
(-0.959) (-1.223) (-1.200) (-1.269) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Post2015*Climate Policy 
Exposure (CCPI) 
49.255** 53.854*** 50.463*** 52.590*** 
(2.258) (4.700) (4.378) (5.166) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Political Instability Exposure 
(SFI) 
-1.156 -0.057 -3.388 -0.806 
(-0.060) (-0.002) (-0.159) (-0.036) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Post2015 -1848.428** -1999.602*** -1838.607*** -1929.102*** 
 (-2.184) (-4.566) (-4.167) (-5.015) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Climate Policy Exposure 
(CCPI) 
0.023 0.576 1.212 0.975 
(0.013) (0.307) (0.745) (0.549) 
Post2015*Political Instability Exposure (SFI) -33.064*** -42.520*** -40.631*** -40.663*** 
 (-3.724) (-3.551) (-3.899) (-3.958) 
Loan Amount -22.798***  -13.221*** -13.195*** 
 (-16.294)  (-8.656) (-8.875) 
Maturity 17.008***  0.132 -0.222 
 (4.989)  (0.021) (-0.034) 
Collateral 31.182**  20.163* 19.199*
 (2.240)  (1.806) (1.716) 
Number of Lenders -1.312***  -0.013 -0.004 
 (-3.228)  (-0.044) (-0.013) 
Performance -36.133***  -20.539*** -20.624*** 
 (-10.837)  (-7.989) (-8.023) 
Number of Covenants 1.139  4.044*** 3.901*** 
 (0.763)  (2.803) (2.759) 
Firm Size  -24.665*** -16.308*** -16.331*** 
  (-19.539) (-12.904) (-12.956) 
Market to Book  -19.580*** -17.158*** -17.186*** 
  (-10.762) (-9.099) (-9.062) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.087** -0.079** -0.078** 
  (-2.572) (-2.463) (-2.422) 
Leverage  0.898*** 0.881*** 0.886*** 
  (10.292) (10.773) (10.958) 
GDP per Capita  -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
  (-0.851) (-0.519) (-0.922) 
GDP Growth  -4.434 -4.040 -4.261 
  (-1.274) (-1.125) (-1.194) 
Observations 44,362 9,492 9,407 9,402 
R-Squared 0.589 0.592 0.603 0.605 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.569 0.560 0.571 0.571 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Table A.7 
Controlling for increasing public attention to the Carbon Bubble issue 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISD, the climate policy exposure and public 
attention is measured by the CCP and the google search of “carbon bubble”, respectively. All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) contains only loan 
characteristics, column (2) only firm and macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and (4) include loan, firm and macro controls. For 
readability, omitted variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets 62.160 32.595 13.510 16.013 
 (1.028) (0.609) (0.307) (0.348) 
Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI)  0.853** 0.664* 0.688* 0.702*
 (2.270) (1.876) (1.960) (1.906) 
Attention (Search “Carbon Bubble”) 0.049 0.045 0.050 0.054 
 (1.093) (0.656) (0.701) (0.824) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Climate Policy 
Exposure (CCPI) 
-1.799 -1.079 -0.614 -0.690 
(-0.971) (-0.718) (-0.491) (-0.519) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets* Attention (Search 
“Carbon Bubble”) 
-8.751*** -7.751** -7.085** -6.927**
(-3.126) (-2.442) (-2.241) (-2.070) 
Attention (Search “Carbon Bubble”)*Climate Policy 
Exposure (CCPI) 
-0.010 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
(-0.765) (-0.037) (-0.063) (-0.093) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Attention (Search 
“Carbon Bubble”)*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 
0.205*** 0.177** 0.164** 0.161**
(2.973) (2.408) (2.292) (2.159) 
Loan Amount -22.781***  -13.161*** -13.153***
 (-16.347)  (-8.569) (-8.803) 
Maturity 17.050***  0.031 -0.367 
 (4.989)  (0.005) (-0.057) 
Collateral 28.149**  19.130* 17.818 
 (2.158)  (1.688) (1.577) 
Number of Lenders -1.313***  -0.020 -0.010 
 (-3.235)  (-0.064) (-0.034) 
Performance -36.133***  -20.612*** -20.671***
 (-10.817)  (-7.959) (-8.012) 
Number of Covenants 1.121  3.961*** 3.827*** 
 (0.757)  (2.744) (2.706) 
Firm Size  -24.678*** -16.357*** -16.379***
  (-19.903) (-12.952) (-13.045) 
Market to Book  -19.507*** -17.097*** -17.121***
  (-10.950) (-9.214) (-9.159) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.085*** -0.078** -0.076**
  (-2.682) (-2.437) (-2.398) 
Leverage  0.899*** 0.882*** 0.887***
  (10.272) (10.741) (10.939) 
GDP per Capita  -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
  (-0.835) (-0.566) (-1.260) 
GDP Growth  -4.601 -4.224 -4.395 
  (-1.308) (-1.165) (-1.225) 
Observations 44,362 9,492 9,407 9,402 
R-Squared 0.589 0.592 0.602 0.605 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.569 0.559 0.570 0.570 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Table A.8 
Loans with maturity longer than 4 years 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISD and the climate policy 
exposure is measured by the CCPI. All variables are as defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the type
of fixed effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) contains only loan characteristics, column (2) 
only firm and macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and (4) include loan, firm and macro controls. For readability,
omitted variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FossilFuel 37.012*** 36.921** 35.503** 37.350** 
(4.186) (2.361) (2.343) (2.283) 
FossilFuel*Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 0.096 0.216 0.310 0.263 
(0.302) (0.546) (0.755) (0.618) 
Loan Amount -24.398***  -13.957*** -13.841*** 
(-16.012)  (-7.783) (-7.414) 
Maturity 64.093***  64.322** 66.724** 
(3.798)  (2.268) (2.436) 
Collateral 28.329  28.473 28.077 
(1.628)  (1.499) (1.514) 
Number of Lenders -1.434***  -0.183 -0.150 
(-3.191)  (-0.589) (-0.486) 
Performance -33.746***  -14.312*** -14.223*** 
(-8.031)  (-5.267) (-5.102) 
Number of Covenants -0.714  2.659 2.659* 
(-0.386)  (1.609) (1.656) 
Firm Size  -22.631*** -13.944*** -14.306*** 
 (-14.273) (-9.096) (-8.898) 
Market to Book  -17.508*** -14.772*** -15.080*** 
 (-8.557) (-6.884) (-6.545) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.078** -0.080*** -0.081*** 
 (-2.608) (-2.723) (-2.715) 
Leverage  0.885*** 0.878*** 0.879*** 
 (10.441) (10.872) (10.997) 
GDP per Capita  -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (-0.270) (0.041) (0.280) 
GDP Growth  -0.536 -0.243 -4.106 
 (-0.280) (-0.130) (-1.632) 
Observations 27,866 6,355 6,269 6,264 
R-Squared 0.626 0.652 0.662 0.664 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.605 0.621 0.632 0.631 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Table A.9 
Loans with maturity longer than 4 years-Proved reserves over total assets 
The table reports coefficients and t statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable is AISD and the climate policy 
exposure is measured by the C3I. All variables are as defined in Table 1. The lower part of the table denotes the type of
fixed effects and clustering used in each specification. Column (1) contains only loan characteristics, column (2) only
firm and macro-level controls. Specifications (3) and (4) include loan, firm and macro controls. For readability, omitted
variables due to collinearity are left out. (* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets 41.648 113.130 38.775 38.646 
(0.807) (1.560) (0.776) (0.762) 
Climate Policy Exposure (CCPI) 1.033** 1.044** 1.159** 1.170** 
 (2.548) (2.148) (2.252) (2.300) 
Proved Reserves over Total Assets*Climate Policy 
Exposure (CCPI)  
-1.258 -2.654 -1.123 -1.138 
(-0.839) (-1.431) (-0.762) (-0.766) 
Loan Amount -24.333***  -13.520*** -13.377*** 
(-16.351)  (-7.042) (-6.734) 
Maturity 65.748***  68.210** 69.899** 
(3.852)  (2.408) (2.503) 
Collateral 41.450**  39.426** 39.002** 
(2.413)  (2.019) (1.999) 
Number of Lenders -1.399***  -0.183 -0.141 
(-3.029)  (-0.583) (-0.455) 
Performance -33.188***  -13.553*** -13.427*** 
(-7.960)  (-5.301) (-5.160) 
Number of Covenants -0.732  2.515 2.499* 
(-0.388)  (1.621) (1.657) 
Firm Size  -22.568*** -14.105*** -14.551*** 
 (-13.950) (-8.831) (-8.570) 
Market to Book  -17.179*** -14.422*** -14.674*** 
 (-7.572) (-6.093) (-5.960) 
Asset Tangibility  -0.083** -0.085*** -0.083** 
 (-2.576) (-2.677) (-2.580) 
Leverage  0.885*** 0.876*** 0.878*** 
 (10.101) (10.299) (10.297) 
GDP per Capita  0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.412) (0.828) (0.175) 
GDP Growth  -0.497 -0.224 -2.360 
 (-0.244) (-0.113) (-1.395) 
Observations 27,445 6,212 6,130 6,125 
R-Squared 0.628 0.656 0.666 0.668 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.607 0.625 0.636 0.636 
Bank*Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Type Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan Purpose Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Time Effects No No No Yes 
Firm's Country Effects No No No Yes 
Clustered Standard Errors Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm Bank, Firm 
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Figure A.1 
The Climate Policy Indices over time 
 
  
The figure illustrates the evolution of the two climate policy indices, C3I and CCPI, over time 
for eight countries. 
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Figure A. 2 
The Google Search Volume Index over time 
The figure illustrates the evolution of the three search terms “Carbon Bubble” (Accessed 23 
April, 2018) 
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